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I. INTRODUCTION

It is an old saw that prosecutors have both an ethical1 and a
obligation to "do justice." The contours of that obligation,
however, are not well defined. 3 This Article addresses one particularly
neglected aspect of the obligation: 4 prosecutors' ethical duty to serve
5
justice after convictions are complete.
Prosecutorial justice issues seem to arise less frequently after
conviction than at trial. Prosecutorial discretion is at its height in the
postconviction context because legislators and professional code
drafters have not focused on postconviction issues. 6 Freed from
binding legal constraints, prosecutors have avoided deep consideration
of how their general obligation to serve justice might apply. Once
defendants have been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
prosecutors' natural inclination in balancing the equities has been to
sidestep defense-oriented actions.
legal 2

1.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (2004) (characterizing
government officers as "minister[s of justice"); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13
(2004) (stating that the prosecutor's "duty is to seek justice").
2.
See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (emphasizing that the
prosecutor is charged with the duty not only to seek convictions but also to see that justice is
done); accord State v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 105 (N.Y. 1984).
3.
See Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private Values: Can, Should, and Will
Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest ?, 41 B.C. L. REV. 789, 790 (2000) (arguing that
prosecutors have a "public interest serving role"); Kenneth Bresler, Pretty Phrases: The
Prosecutor as Minister of Justice and Administrator of Justice, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1301,
1305 (1996) (discussing the difference between characterizing prosecutors as "ministers of
justice" and requiring them to "seek justice"); Bruce A. Green, Why Should Prosecutors "Seek
Justice",26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 619 (1999) (discussing "prosecutorial discretion" as a source
of the obligation to "seek justice").
4.
In previous works, I have addressed the concept of justice with respect to prosecutorial
activities at the pretrial and trial stages and in plea bargaining. Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring
the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice: Can ProsecutorsDo Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 48,
79 (1991) [hereinafter Zacharias, Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice] (discussing the
prosecutor's ethical duty to "do justice" at trial and in pretrial activities that are interwined with
the trial stage (e.g., discovery)); Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining,39 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1998) [hereinafter Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining] (discussing the
prosecutor's obligation to "do justice" in the context of plea bargaining).
5.
Throughout this Article, I refer to postconviction obligations as those occurring after a
criminal proceeding is fully finalized, including the appellate process.
6.
See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 cmt. (stating that "[p]recisely how far
the prosecutor is required to go [to see that the defendant is accorded prosecutorial justice] is a
matter of debate and varies in different jurisdictions.").
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Identifying and analyzing the obligation to serve justice after
convictions is important precisely because so little attention has been
paid to it. The American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal
Prosecutions,7 for example, address prosecutorial conduct at all stages
through sentencing, but then stop. Although the Standards are
designed to flesh out prosecutors' ethical obligations in more detail
than the model codes, they fail to provide guidance in the very context
in which prosecutors most need it.
There are at least three reasons why prosecutors are illequipped to analyze post-trial obligations on their own. First, as
already suggested, there is little law on the subject. Few statutory
requirements for prosecutorial postconviction conduct exist.8
Ordinarily, the existence of a fair trial and appellate system will
satisfy constitutional due process requirements. 9 Only rarely have
judicial decisions focused on general postconviction duties, so treatises
on prosecutorial conduct also have tended to ignore them.1 0 Thus, from
the outset, prosecutors are left entirely to personal resources in
defining their post-trial role.
Second, prosecutors' incentives at the postconviction stage
militate against taking action that benefits convicted defendants.
Such action may involve confronting a prosecutor's own error or
undermining the reputation of a colleague who erred. It means
undertaking additional work that ordinarily is not required by legal
requirements or the demands of supervisors. Conversely, the
overwhelming workloads of prosecutors and the presumption of guilt
that attaches to convicted defendants can justify inaction. As a policy
matter, the reopening of a closed a case invites public distrust of the
accuracy of the criminal justice system.1 1
Third, and perhaps the most important reason why prosecutors
have difficulty addressing their postconviction ethical obligations, is
7.
ABA Standardsfor CriminalJustice ProsecutionFunction and Def. Function, Standards
3-1.1 to 3-6.2 (3rd ed. 1993).
8.
These statutes are discussed infra notes 74 and in the accompanying text.
9.
See, e.g., Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 364 (1983) (overruling postconviction relief
because errors by defendant's trial counsel did not "deprive [defendant] of a trial whose result
[was] unfair or unreliable" (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984))); Smith
v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) ("[T]he touchstone of due process analysis in cases of alleged
prosecutorial misconduct is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor."); cf.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967) (distinguishing between trial errors that can be
deemed harmless error because the process was essentially fair and those requiring automatic
reversal).
10. E.g., BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT §§ 12:12-:32 (2d ed. 1985);
JOSEPH F. LAWLESS, JR., PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 14.34-.51 (1999).

11. Of course, this factor is only significant when the reconsideration becomes, or is likely to
become, public.
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the complexity of identifying what it means to serve justice. On the
one hand, prosecutors properly presume that convicted defendants
have received a fair trial and have been punished appropriately. Thus,
almost any prosecutorial reaction that maintains the status quo seems
justified.12 On the other hand, once appeals are complete, the
prosecutor may be the only participant in the criminal justice system
in a position to rectify a wrong. Information suggesting or probative of
a wrong often is in the prosecutor's exclusive possession. 13 The
prosecutor also may be the only person with the power to act, either
because the requisite resources are subject to the prosecutor's
domain1 4 or because statutes delegate the right to reopen matters to
prosecutorial discretion. 15 Prosecutors, for the most part, have been
left to their own devices in determining how to balance these
considerations.
Part II of this Article frames the issues by categorizing realistic
scenarios that implicate a postconviction obligation to do justice. Part
III discusses the limited case law addressing the subject. Part IV
identifies ways that prosecutors and rulemakers might think about
the issues. Finally, Part V outlines preliminary suggestions for how
ethics code drafters and other regulators should begin to resolve some
of the core questions.
At the outset, however, it is important to acknowledge the
limits of this Article's project. At best, one can only hope to identify
considerations, reasons, or ways of analyzing appropriate conduct by
prosecutors. The absence of legal constraints eliminates the possibility
of defining clearly correct, or incorrect, behavior. Similarly, a
consensus regarding particularized ethics rules is unlikely to develop.
In most cases, the conflict between the presumption of guilt and
seemingly "fair" prosecutorial conduct is strong, thus rendering any
resolution debatable.
Nevertheless the project is necessary, if only to raise the
consciousness of prosecutors and rulemakers. Inattention to the issues
leads to a baseline of prosecutorial inaction. 16 Yet the development of
modern forensic technology that enhances society's ability to prove
12. See Zacharias, Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice, supra note 4, at 46-47 (discussing
the malleability of the justice standard).
13. Some instances are discussed infra Part II.A. and text accompanying notes 26-39.
14. An example of this occurs when DNA evidence is in police custody and the only person
that can require it to be tested and made available to a previous defendant is the prosecutor.
15. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2004) (referring applications for postconviction
DNA testing to prosecutors' offices).
16. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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facts previously unprovable militates in favor of reevaluating prior
convictions in more cases.
Moreover, the few scenarios in which prosecutors have acted
typically have involved potentially innocent defendants. In reality,
however, ethical dilemmas also arise in many situations in which
culpability is not in issue, and which therefore require prosecutors to
consider factors other than a defendant's blameworthiness. 17 As a
consequence, prosecutors need a better framework for addressing their
obligations than the prevailing decisional law and ethics codes
provide.
II. WHEN ARE PROSECUTORS' POSTCONVICTION JUSTICE OBLIGATIONS
IMPLICATED?

The situations in which a prosecutor must at least consider an
ethical duty to help a convicted defendant fall within four overlapping
categories. The prosecutor may obtain new information relevant to the
conviction. The defendant or his lawyer may request specific
assistance. The law may change in a pertinent way. Or the passage of
time may affect the equities of the defendant's case.
There also are a few categories of situations in which
prosecutors' duty to serve justice may require prosecutors either to
take action disadvantageousto convicted defendants or neutral action
that benefits victims of the crime or victims of the conviction.
Ordinarily, the completion of a trial and appeal signals the end of the
prosecutor's job, at least until some problem with the original
proceedings surfaces. Sometimes, however, the effects of a defendant's
behavior continue or the prosecutor is in a unique position to assure
that certain good or bad consequences of the conviction are carried
forward or avoided. The following pages set forth a series of scenarios
within each of the above categories that highlight the range of
quandaries prosecutors can face.
A. New Information
Several kinds of relevant new information may come into a
prosecutor's possession after a conviction is complete. These include
exculpatory evidence, information highlighting potential defects in the
process leading to the prior conviction, and evidence made possible by
the development of new technology.
17.

See infra text accompanying notes 26-39.
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1. Exculpatory evidence

Because participants in crimes and criminal investigations
tend to operate in a world of interlinked or recurring activity,
prosecutors frequently receive information that relates to prior crimes.
Often this information simply reconfirms the likely guilt of a
defendant or the routine nature of a prior investigation. Occasionally,
however, prosecutors learn information that casts some degree of
doubt on prior proceedings and the resulting conviction.
Such information typically comes to prosecutors in one of three
ways. A prosecutor may simply learn it accidentally in reviewing
evidence or interviewing witnesses involved in a different case. A
defendant, defendant's family, or defendant's lawyer may bring the
prosecutor new evidence. Or, a different suspect or defendant may
confess to the crime the defendant was convicted of committing, either
in plea bargaining or as a means of alleviating pangs of conscience.
The way the prosecutor receives the information can affect the
imperative that she act.18 When the defendant or those allied with the
defendant already have the information, they are in a position to
persuade others in the process-judges, parole boards, and pardon
authorities-to rely upon it. When another person confesses to the
prior crime, the prosecutor shares responsibility for dealing with the
information with the police, who will also be privy to the confessor's
statements. In contrast, when a prosecutor simply notices information
in one case file that has bearing on a prior matter, she may be in sole
possession of the information. Her obligation to act on that
information therefore may be heightened.
It is important to recognize that the exculpatory nature of new
evidence can vary dramatically. At one extreme, new information may
be so clear and persuasive that it essentially exonerates the
defendant-as, for example, with a credible deathbed confession by
another person that can be corroborated through physical evidence.
Information at the other extreme may simply raise a question, while
leaving the prosecutor convinced that the convicted defendant is
guilty. It may rise to the level of exculpatory evidence under the
constitutional definition of Brady v. Maryland,19 or have less probative
18. This Article refers to prosecutors as female and to other actors in the process (e.g.,
defendants) as male.
19. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that nondisclosure of exculpatory evidence violates due
process when the evidence is "material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution"); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54
(1972) (holding that the Brady rule encompasses impeachment evidence when there is a
"reasonable likelihood [that it would] have affected the judgment of the jury" (quoting Napue v.
Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 271 (1959))); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682-85 (1985) (defining
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value. Whatever the quality of the information, however, once a
prosecutor determines that the information is pertinent, she must at
least consider whether the information should be disclosed or
otherwise pursued.
2. Information relating to possible defects in the process
In the course of prosecuting subsequent crimes, prosecutors
sometimes come to realize that participants in a previous defendant's
case are ethically flawed. For example, a prosecutor may learn that
the investigating police officers currently are corrupt or dishonest in
testifying or that they engage in investigatory misconduct. She may
learn that the prosecutor in the prior case or supervisory prosecutors
are corrupt. She may determine either that these participants in the
prior case engaged in misconduct in the prior defendant's specific
matter, or she may simply learn of a pattern or course of current
conduct that raises her suspicion that the law enforcement officials
have engaged in misconduct generally (and therefore, perhaps,
engaged in misconduct in defendant's case).
A prosecutor sometimes develops similar concerns regarding
problems in evidence gathering. She may become aware of defects in
routine laboratory or evidence-safekeeping procedures that could have
tainted prior evidence. 20 Alternatively, she may learn facts that
suggest that particular evidence introduced against a defendant was
false or questionable-for example, when a regular police informant is
shown to have testified falsely in other trials.
It is again important to recognize the range of suspicion that
these types of information can raise. In the most troublesome
scenario, a prosecutor actually will learn of a specific problem that
convinces her that the trial or evidentiary process was abused in a
previously convicted defendant's case. In other cases, the prosecutor
may simply become aware of proof that the process or participants in
the process are flawed in a current unrelated case, but in a way that
causes the prosecutor to wonder whether the problem has been
widespread.
materiality as meaning "reasonable probability" that the result of the proceeding would have
been different if the exculpatory or impeachment evidence had been disclosed to the defense or "a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome").
20. See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Houston DNA Review Clears Convicted Rapist, and Ripples in
Texas Could be Vast, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, at A14 (describing the reaction of the Houston
prosecutor's office to an audit disclosing widespread flaws in evidence gathering by the county's
forensic laboratory).
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3. Information available through technological developments
Consider this scenario:
Twenty years ago, a defendant was convicted of rape based on shaky eyewitness
testimony that he was the rapist. Semen samples were recovered from the victim but, at
the time, DNA testing was either unavailable or prohibitively expensive. Defendant at
all times has proclaimed his innocence. A different person, in custody for a different
rape, now becomes a possible suspect. The samples remain available for DNA testing.

One can analyze this scenario on a variety of levels. The
prosecutor may already have test results showing the presence of the
alternative suspect's semen in the victim. Alternatively, the
prosecutor may only have learned recently that the other person, who
had some connection to the first victim, is a serial rapist. The new
technology may demonstrate the convicted defendant's innocence, it
may raise a realistic possibility of innocence, or it may simply be
available (if the prosecutor uses it) to reevaluate the convicted
21
defendant's culpability.
These issues, of course, are not limited to DNA evidence. Over
time, many varieties of scientific testing have developed or become
more conclusive than they were when the conviction occurred. 22 The
passage of time always produces new technological developments that
defendants can claim will help establish their innocence. Unless
prosecutors adopt a bright-line rule that "what's done is done," they
must identify criteria for determining when these developments
justify a new prosecutorial response.
B. Requests for ProsecutorialAssistance by a Defendant or Persons
Associated with a Defendant
The DNA issue highlights another series of prosecutorial
dilemmas regarding how prosecutors should respond to requests for
assistance by convicted defendants (or persons associated with the
defendants). The defendant in the rape hypothetical may ask the
prosecutor to take active steps to assist him-in particular, to conduct
DNA tests to determine who actually was the rapist. At least at some
level, such a request is justified when the prosecutor has exclusive
21. According to the Innocence Project, 123 convicted defendants have been exonerated
through the use of DNA evidence. See Innocence Project, Case Profiles: Featured Cases, at
http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/index.php (last visited Mar. 13, 2005); see also Keith A.
Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful
Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333, 336 (2002) (commenting that, since the late 1980s, DNA
typing has been used to exonerate over one hundred defendants in the U.S.).
22. This includes such forensic developments as fingerprinting, blood-typing, paraffintesting, and polygraphs.
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control of the material in question (the semen and alternative suspect)
and the convicted defendant lacks the resources to perform the
investigative steps himself.
Alternative scenarios are possible, however. The defendant
may simply ask the prosecutor to cooperate in, or not impede, his own
investigation. He may, for example, ask the prosecutor to provide
access to the preserved sample, so that defendant's expert can conduct
his own tests at defendant's cost.
One can envision a variety of similar scenarios in which
defendant may request active steps, minimal cooperation, or simply
forbearance from interference with a convicted defendant's ongoing
investigation. For example, when police involved in the defendant's
case have been shown to engage in the same type of misconduct that
defendant claims occurred in his case, defendant may ask the
prosecutor's office to investigate the police, to make the police
available for interrogation, or to open the officers' personnel files to
defense investigators.
The form of defendants' requests also can vary. A request for
cooperation may come to a prosecutor informally, before any litigation
is initiated. Alternatively, a prosecutor may force a defendant to file a
habeas corpus petition or new trial motion and then treat the request
as one for discovery. Where the requested evidence is speculative, in
the sense that its importance cannot be determined until investigation
is undertaken, courts are unlikely to entertain discovery requests
unless the defendant can offer independent new evidence establishing
likely innocence. 23 The prosecutor's decision to decline cooperation
initially thus can effectively prevent defense efforts to obtain the new
24
information.
Of course, defendants or their representatives may ask
prosecutors for even more. Depending on the nature of the new
information, a defendant may implore a prosecutor to assist the
defendant actively, by joining in a motion for a new trial, seeking
dismissal of a case after-the-fact, or providing favorable
recommendations in parole or pardon settings. Prosecutors are almost
never legally required to provide such assistance, 25 but they
23. See notes 45 and accompanying text.
24. See Judith A. Goldberg & David M. Siegel, The Ethical Obligations of Prosecutors in
Cases Involving Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 389, 393 (2002) (arguing
that "the likelihood of success [in postconviction claims] can be dramatically affected by how the
government responds").
25. The main exception occurs when prosecutors make enforceable promises during plea
bargaining, such as an agreement to help a defendant seek a departure from sentencing
guideline limitations in exchange for cooperation. See infra text accompanying note 101.
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sometimes provide it nonetheless. The sole source of any obligation to
act is the prosecutor's general ethical duty to see that justice is done.
C. Changes in the Law
There are at least two kinds of changes in the law that can
affect a convicted defendant's situation in a way that implicates
prosecutorial obligations. First, the substantive law governing
defendant's crime and sentence may have been amended, but not
retroactively. Thus, for example, a jurisdiction might legalize
marijuana use or reduce the penalty from felony to petty misdemeanor
status, but not authorize the release or resentencing of persons
convicted under the old law. 26 Second, statutory or decisional law
governing discovery may change in a manner that would have allowed
a defendant to obtain or introduce particular evidence that was denied
at the time of trial.
At a minimum, these changes alter the equities surrounding
the defendant's incarceration. They may also suggest that the prior
conviction was unfair, though legal redress is no longer possible. The
prosecutor may be in a unique position to change the defendant's
situation or to provide him with access to evidence that the defendant
could not force the prosecutor to produce.
D. Changes in the Equities
One can imagine numerous scenarios in which a properly
convicted defendant might have an equitable claim to mercy on the
part of a prosecutor. A fully rehabilitated defendant might seek a
prosecutor's assistance in obtaining a parole or pardon. The world's
view of the seriousness of the defendant's crime may have changed
since the conviction, as in the marijuana example discussed above 2 7
and in cases involving consensual homosexual sodomy 2 and
physician-assisted suicide. 29 The defendant may perform acts
26. Alternatively, the range of permissible sentences, or sentences mandated under
sentencing guidelines, might be amended.
27. See supra text accompanying note 26.
28. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986) and holding unconstitutional laws criminalizing homosexual sodomy).
29. See, e.g., C. Ann Potter, Esq., Will the "Right to Die" Become a License to Kill? The
Growth of Euthanasia in America, 19 J. LEGIS. 31, 46-50 (1993) (noting the gradual
transformation of American attitudes regarding euthanasia); Deborah Sharp, Senior Suicides to
Increase as America Ages; Rate is 50% Higher than the Other Age Groups, and Baby Boomers Are
Just Beginning to Gray, USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 2003, at A3 (stating that, despite overwhelming
disapproval of suicide generally, there has been growing acceptance of physician-assisted
suicides); cf Jeffrey Kuhner, Ageism: The Overlooked Discrimination, NATIONAL POST, Apr. 4,
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beneficial to society that deserve acknowledgment, either morally
laudable acts or acts of cooperation with police and prosecutors in
dealing with the criminal conduct of others.30 Additionally there may
be equitable reasons for a defendant's release from prison to benefit
third persons-as in the case of a dying spouse or child.
Typically, corrections officials, parole boards, and pardoning
authorities control postconviction release. Nevertheless, prosecutors
sometimes can play a role, particularly when the grounds for release
are predicated on equities arising from legal issues (such as changes
in prosecution policies regarding the crime for which the defendant
has been convicted). Thus, prosecutors sometimes must decide
whether justice requires them to take action that would help a
defendant directly or that would confirm information that might
support his pleas for assistance to other agencies.
E. PostconvictionProceedingsDisadvantageousto Defendants
It is common for observers thinking about prosecutors'
postconviction obligations to focus upon prosecutorial action that is
necessary to correct flaws in prior proceedings that injured a
vulnerable defendant. The opposite scenario also is plausible,
however. The prior proceedings may properly have convicted a
defendant but not have gone far enough in addressing his crime.
Prosecutors might have a role to play in assuring that additional steps
are taken.
Consider, for example, a case in which victims of criminal
conduct seek civil remedies against a convicted defendant. What, if
any, is the obligation of the prosecutor to provide information
pertinent to a parallel civil lawsuit, a request for a future restraining
order, or a demand for custody of children whose parent is
incarcerated? Before conviction, a prosecutor's obligations arguably
are limited by her need to preserve the sanctity of her evidence for
trial and by the importance of maintaining objectivity in prosecutorial
decisionmaking. Once the conviction is complete, this calculus
changes. The interests of the victims may assume more importance
relative to those of the defendant or the state.
Similarly, even after guilt has been firmly established and the
initial sentence set, the contours of a defendant's sentence usually
2002, at A19 (describing the growing acceptance of euthanasia as a sign of declining concern for
the aged).
30. Consider, for example, whether prosecutors and other law enforcement personnel
should be able to compensate a prisoner who has shown signs of rehabilitation and saves the
lives of hostages during a prison riot.
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remain flexible. Pardon, parole, and other sentence-reduction
procedures will be available. Does a prosecutor owe it to the victims or
to the state to become involved in disputing a defendant's claim for
mercy?
Finally, prosecutors might have a role to play in ancillary
proceedings that flow from criminal convictions. Recent Supreme
Court decisions, for example, have separated civil commitment of sex
offenders from criminal prosecutions, 31 but they both serve the
function of incapacitating defendants from committing further crimes.
Likewise, registration of sex offenders after their release from
incarceration is designed to deter future misconduct and protect
future victims. Arguably, a prosecutor's duty to do justice encompasses
at least some consideration of whether she should involve herself in
such complementary proceedings, either because of her obligations to
the victims or her responsibility to further the original state interests.
F. Actions Benefiting Victims of the Crime or Conviction
The previous section alluded to civil proceedings that can
benefit victims or victim interests. As discussed, prosecutors at times
may have some obligation to side with victims, and against the
defendant, in pursuing these alternative mechanisms for redress.
There are, however, other more neutral actions prosecutors might
take to assist innocent persons who are victims of the initial crime or
who have been injured by their relationship to the prosecution and
conviction.
Must a prosecutor, for example, notify victims and witnesses of
a defendant's release from incarceration? 32 Arguably, this is a job for
corrections officials or police. The prosecutor, however, may have dealt
most with the affected persons. She may also be the only
33
governmental actor who has maintained contact with them.
31. See, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369-71 (1997) (holding that postincarceration "civil" commitment of a ."sexually_-violent predator" did not constitute double
jeopardy).
32. Cf. Pusey v. City of Youngstown, 11 F.3d 652, 657 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that a
prosecutor's failure to inform the victim's mother of possible reduction of charges against her
son's killer did not deprive her of any procedural or substantive due process rights); Proposed
Victims' Rights Amendment, S.J. RES. 1, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposing a constitutional
amendment that would state, inter alia, that "[a] victim of violent crime shall have the right to
reasonable and timely notice of any public proceeding involving the crime and of any release or
escape of the accused").
33. Thus, for example, the prosecutor may be the only law enforcement official who knows
of victims' addresses or telephone numbers.
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To the extent the prosecutor has made promises to take
particular steps to victims, witnesses, or even the defendant (e.g., in
plea bargaining), the potential obligation to carry through on those
steps becomes more concrete. 34 Consider this range of promises and
pseudo-promises:
A prosecutor promises not to prosecute a defendant's spouse or child if he pleads
35
guilty;
A prosecutor promises a defendant who is a single mother that her child will not be
taken away if she pleads guilty to a misdemeanor;
A prosecutor suggests that the two above results will occur, but makes no direct promise
(though she is aware that the defendant understands her comments as a promise).

Only in the first situation can the prosecutor actually control
the outcome. But she can influence the outcome in all three situations.
Even if the prosecutor would have had no obligation to pursue those
outcomes had she not induced the defendant's plea, the question
arises whether her statements give rise to new or supplemental
obligations.
Consider a related, but perhaps even more difficult question:
does a prosecutor have any responsibility to assist persons who are
injured by a defendant's incarceration? An innocent wife or children of
a defendant, for example, may become homeless as a result of his
conviction.
Does the answer change if the very thrust of the prosecution
was to punish a parent for conduct that injured a child 36 or to remove
a parent from the home? 37 Social service agencies may be available to
deal with the situation, which suggests that the government's role in
the postconviction matter has been assigned to someone other than
the prosecutor. But the prosecutor at least may owe the affected third34. See infra Part III.C. (citing authorities regarding plea bargaining promises).
35. See, e.g., Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244, 1245-1247 (11th Cir. 1985) (promised
dismissal of charges against defendant's pregnant wife); Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 835
(4th Cir. 1982) (promise to dismiss a pending indictment against the defendant's wife); Allyn v.
Comm'r. of Corr. Servs., 708 F. Supp. 592, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (promise to allow the defendants'
daughter to plead to a reduced charge).
36. Such conduct might include child abuse or neglect.
37. In an episode of the television series The Practice,for example, a prosecutor insisted on
criminally prosecuting Christian Science parents of a child who refused to authorize medical
attention for their child because of their religious beliefs. As a result of the prosecution, both
loving parents were (at least in theory) incarcerated, leaving the child homeless and parentless.
The Practice:The Cradle Will Rock (ABC television broadcast, Oct. 20, 2002).
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party the effort to make sure that the independent agency becomes
38
properly involved, or that it can perform its functions effectively.
In part, this last set of issues becomes interesting because the
prosecutor's own proper conduct in convicting a defendant sometimes
will have contributed to the third party's injury. Perhaps the
prosecutor took the potential for injury into account when screening
the case and making sentencing recommendations. The actual plight
of the third party will have changed after sentencing, however,
perhaps even in a way that the prosecutor did not intend. 39 The
question then becomes whether new prosecutorial obligations arise.
III. THE LIMITED LAW GOVERNING PROSECUTORS' POSTCONVICTION
OBLIGATIONS

Prosecutors' obligations in most of the scenarios discussed
above are subject entirely to prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutors
generally have no legal duty to act for or against convicted defendants
or in connection with ancillary proceedings. There are, however, a few
areas in which one might expect to find some law governing
prosecutorial conduct-in particular, obligations with respect to (1)
exculpatory or potentially exculpatory information, (2) promises
prosecutors have made to defendants or third parties, and (3) the
ability of prosecutors to participate, or not participate, in proceedings
indirectly related to the criminal prosecutions. Surprisingly, the law is
sparse even in these areas. The following subsections describe the
legal landscape.
A. ProceduralBackground
A prosecutor who learns of even fully exculpatory evidence does
not have personal authority to release a convicted defendant. The
ordinary procedure for adjusting a conviction is for a defendant to
bring a motion to vacate the judgment and for a new trial (with or
38. For example, a prosecutor's refusal to offer use immunity to defendants in child abuse
actions typically prevents those defendants from speaking with social service agencies or family
courts that must decide whether children should be removed from the defendants' custody. The
defendants' cooperation, in fact, may be essential to determining what truly is in the best
interests of the children.
39. The fact that a parent has injured a child once, for example, does not always mean that
terminating custody is best for the child, particularly if the criminal conduct stemmed from a
curable disability on the parent's part (e.g., substance abuse). Prosecutors, therefore, may incur
some obligation to supervise the effects of their ongoing or completed prosecution of the parent
upon ancillary custody proceedings. Often, however, prosecutors ignore those effects and
artificially deem the prosecutions separate from the child-protective proceedings.
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without the prosecutor's blessing).40 Only once a court grants that
motion does the prosecutor regain the discretion to dismiss or to
41
negotiate a result that she had before conviction.
The law governing motions for new trial is highly
disadvantageous to convicted defendants. Many jurisdictions forbid
such motions after the expiration of statutory deadlines, 42 although
even these jurisdictions often find ways to allow patently innocent
defendants to avoid a limitations period. 43 More importantly,
petitioners must establish not only that the proffered evidence is
admissible and new (i.e., was not available at the time of trial),44 but
also that the evidence, had it been available, probably would have
produced a different result. 45 Although a prosecutor's consent to a
40. E.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (2003) (providing procedures for requesting a new trial); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1201.5-1202 (2003) (notes of decisions commenting on motion to vacate and new
trial motions respectively); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.600 (2004) (providing grounds for a new trial); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/116-1 (2003) (providing rules for making a motion for a new trial); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. § 440.10 (2003) (providing procedures for making a motion to vacate).
41. See, e.g. Tafero v. State, 406 So. 2d 89, 94 n.11 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("[T]he fact
that the state agrees that a conviction should be set aside because of newly discovered evidence
neither prevents the entry of the original judgment nor fosters the rule of finality."); cf. Holland
v. State, 729 S.W.2d 366, 370 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that the prosecutor's acquiescence to a
motion for a new trial "would not have eviscerated the trial court's discretion").
42. Under federal law, new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence must be
brought within three years of conviction. FED. R. CRIM. P. 33 (2003). The majority of states have
adopted statutes of limitation ranging from fifteen days to three years. See, e.g., MINN. R. CRIM.
P. 26.04(3) (2003) (fifteen day limit); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2103 (2003) (3 year limit); see also
DONALD E. WILKES, STATE POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 1-13, at 56 (2001)
(cataloguing state statutes and noting that only nine states allow defendants to seek new trials
at any time); cf. Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 103 (Tenn. 2001) (rejecting the application of
a statute of limitations on the basis that "the [defendant's] interest in obtaining a hearing to
present newly discovered evidence that may establish actual innocence of a capital offense far
outweighs any governmental interest in preventing the litigation of stale claims").
43. See, e.g., State v. Mooney, 670 S.W.2d 510, 515 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]here is
authority for an appellate court, in a proper case, to grant a motion to remand a case to the trial
court to enable an appellant to move for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, after the
[deadline for appellate review has expired].").
44. See, e.g., U.S. v. Battle, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1208 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (considering "newly
discovered evidence" because it did not exist at the time of trial); People v. Wise, 752 N.Y.S.2d
837, 847-48 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002) (finding DNA evidence pertinent to a new trial motion because
it was not previously available); see also John A. Glenn, J.D., Annotation, What Constitutes
"Newly Discovered Evidence" Within the Meaning of Rule 33 of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure Relating to Motions for New Trial, 44 A.L.R. FED. 13, 19 (1979) (discussing the
meaning of newly discovered evidence).
45. See, e.g., FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.600 (2003) (requiring a showing that the evidence probably
would have changed the verdict); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 851 (2004) (requiring evidence
that would "probably have changed the verdict or finding of guilty."); N.Y. CRIM. PRO. § 440.10
(2003) (requiring new evidence that would produce a verdict more favorable to the defendant);
United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 491 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that evidence not likely to
produce an acquittal is insufficient to merit a new trial); United States v. Wright, 625 F.2d 1017,
1019 (1st Cir. 1980) (requiring a showing that new evidence "will probably result in an acquittal
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motion for a new trial may have persuasive effect on a judge making
these determinations, 46 it does not change the standard that the court
must apply. 47 When a defendant and prosecutor agree that a manifest
injustice occurred but jurisdictional and judicial impediments prevent
access to a new trial, the only recourse may be to seek pardon or
48
clemency from the executive branch.
In some jurisdictions, procedural mechanisms exist through
which defendants can use new evidence to attack their convictions or
sentences, 49 but most of these are freighted with obstacles similar to
those hindering new trial motions. In the federal system, collateral
attacks are possible through habeas corpus statutes. 50 These require a
upon retrial" in order to succeed on a motion for a new trial); United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d
417, 448 (7th Cir. 1991) (arguing that the availability of new evidence that was "merely
impeaching" was insufficient to show that the verdict would have been different and thus does
not merit a new trial (quoting United States v. Van Daal Wyk, 840 F.2d 494, 500 (7th Cir.
1988))); Jones v. Texas, 711 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. 1986) (stating that if new evidence is "not such
as would probably bring about a different result upon a new trial, it is within [the trial court's]
discretion to deny the motion [for a new trial]").
46. See, e.g., State v. Hursey, 861 P.2d 615, 619 (Ariz. 1993) (overruling the trial court's
refusal to follow the state's recommendation of a new trial based on the state's recognition of a
prosecutor's conflict of interest); see also Commonwealth v. Williams, 471 N.E.2d 394, 395 (Mass.
App. Ct. 1984) (reversing a conviction based, in part, on the prosecutor's request that the appeal
be dealt with summarily, and noting that state "confessions of error are entitled to be given great
weight"); Holly Schaffter, Note, Postconviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in State
Courts, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 695, 720 (2002) (noting that "it has been the experience of many
defense attorneys that few judges are willing to order DNA testing for a habeas petition without
the consent of the prosecutors").
47. See supranote 45.
48. In one recent case, judicial relief was unavailable to a defendant sentenced to the death
penalty after the courts denied his requests for DNA analysis of evidence pertinent to his
conviction. See Shannon Tan, Inmate's Allies Seek DNA Test; Analysis of Blood on Man's Shorts
Could Clear Condemned Man, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 24, 2003, at B04 (reporting on the
necessity of DNA testing for the defendant's clemency hearing); Thomas Vanes, Let DNA Close
Door on Doubt in Murder Cases; Before a Prisoner Is Executed, Justice Often Demands That
Critical Test, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2003, at Bl1 (commenting on the denial of the defendant's
request for DNA analysis of evidence). A prosecutor and jurors in the defendant's case, who
believed that DNA evidence might have made a difference in the decision to seek execution,
joined in asking the parole board to recommend to the governor that he stay execution pending
testing. Lois Romano, Indiana Governor Delays Execution for DNA Testing, WASHINGTON POST,
July 29, 2003, at A02 (reporting governor's stay of execution "just hours after the prosecutor who
had sought the death penalty as well as a juror took the unusual step of pleading with the state
parole board to spare Darnell Williams").
49. See, e.g., Sample v. State, 82 S.W.3d 267, 274 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Workman v. State, 41
S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001) for the proposition that "due process mandate[s] an exception to the
one-year statute of limitations where a petitioner in a capital case sleeks] a writ of error coram
nobis based on newly discovered evidence of actual innocence"); Reedy v. Wright, No. CLOOOOO23, 2002 WL 598434, at *4 (Va. Cir. Ct. Apr. 8, 2002) ("[C]ases are decided from time to time
which hold that, when no other form of judicial relief is available to a prisoner who is actually
innocent, coram nobis will fill the gap.").
50. E.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255 (2004) (establishing rules for writs of habeas corpus
regarding prisoners in state and federal custody).
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defendant to establish constitutional or other prejudice that infected
the trial process with error. 5 1 Only a minority of federal circuits
recognize the possibility of postconviction relief based solely on proof
52
of innocence.
All states have collateral attack provisions. Some jurisdictions
permit collateral attacks to be used to circumvent time limitations
governing the filing of new trial motions. 5 But these mechanisms
typically impose the same presumptions as those in effect under the
new trial statutes: defendants must establish the probability that a
54
new trial would lead to a different result.
In many jurisdictions, defendants can seek to have their
sentences reduced based on new information. 55 The position of
51. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993) (holding that maintaining a
conviction in the face of new evidence does not in and of itself constitute a constitutional due
process violation); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982) (requiring a showing that
"that the errors at... trial . . . worked to [an] actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting
[the] entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions"); see also DONALD E. WILKES, JR.,
FEDERAL POSTCONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF § 4-4, at 171 (1996) (describing collateral

proceedings as attacks based on jurisdictional, constitutional, or other fundamental errors).
Under recent legislation, some federal collateral attacks are now subject to a one year statute of
limitations. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, tit. 1, § 105,
110 Stat. 1214, 1220 (1996) (adding a one year statute of limitations for relief under 28 U.S.C. §
2255 which, prior to 1996, allowed "relief [to be ordered] at any time").
52. See WILKES, supra note 51, § 4-4 at 172 & n.13 (identifying circuits in which new proof
of innocence alone can justify relief).
53. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1336-37 (Ill. 1996) (holding that a
claim of innocence based on newly-discovered evidence raises a constitutional issue under
Illinois' due process clause); accord In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 749-50 (Cal. 1993) (finding a delay
in filing a habeas petition to be justified when the petitioner '"ad good reason to believe other
meritorious claims existed, and ... the existence of facts supporting those claims could not with
due diligence have been confirmed at an earlier time"); Miller v. Comm'r., 700 A.2d 1108, 1132
(Conn. 1997) (affirming the grant of a writ of habeas corpus where the "habeas petitioner has
established by clear and convincing evidence that he is actually innocent"); see also WILKES,
supra note 51, § 1-5 (cataloguing state provisions).
54. See, e.g., Trepal v. State, 846 So. 2d 405, 438 (Fla. 2003) (Pariente, J., concurring)
(imposing a requirement of likelihood that the trial would have produced a different result);
Foley v. Commonwealth, 17 S.W.3d 878, 888 (Ky. 2000) (finding that new evidence regarding the
victim's state of mind would not have changed the verdict); In re Personal Restraint of Gentry,
972 P.2d 1250, 1260 (Wash. 1999) ('[The] question is not whether the defendant would more
likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." (quoting
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995))).
55. See, e.g., People v. Dunlop, 36 P.3d 778, 780 (Colo. 2001) (holding that a resentencing
court may consider new evidence); State v. Rome, 5 P.3d 515, 518 (Kan. 2000) (affirming an
increased sentence by holding that a resentencing court should consider all facts existing at the
time of the original sentencing, not simply what the state was aware of, regardless of whether
those facts were admitted at the original sentencing hearing); State v. South, 427 S.E.2d 666,
670 (S.C. 1993) (allowing resentencing in capital cases based on newly discovered evidence that
probably would have changed the original sentencing); State v. Thomas, 991 P.2d 870, 877-878
(Idaho Ct. App. 1999) (allowing a defendant to challenge a sentence as excessive in light of new
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prosecutors regarding resentencing has the same impact as at the
original sentencing. The right to challenge a sentence, however,
typically is strictly limited to 120 days, or less, from the date a
56
conviction becomes complete.
B. The Law Governing ProsecutorialDisclosures
The procedural background just discussed illustrates that
prosecutors do not unilaterally control review of defendants'
convictions. As a consequence, prosecutors must often consider what
legal obligations they have at least to disclose information that might
help defendants seek redress on their own. Pre-conviction,
prosecutors' duties are prescribed by discovery rules, none of which
apply in the postconviction context, and by constitutional Brady
requirements that sometimes mandate the disclosure of truly
exculpatory evidence.
1. Exculpatory evidence
Suppose that, after conviction, 51 a prosecutor for the first time
receives exculpatory evidence that fits within Brady's requirements in
all respects. 58 Must she disclose it to the convicted defendant?
evidence); see also Reeves v. State, 5 S.W.3d 41, 44 (Ark. 1999) (recognizing that ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 16-90-11 (2003) allows resentencing at any time to correct an illegal sentence while in custody
but holding that this does not apply to claims consisting solely of a plea of innocence); WILKES,
supra note 51, § 1-5, at 17 (identifying state provisions regarding resentencing). After the
adoption of the federal sentencing guidelines, a new federal rule limited the power of federal
judges to resentence. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (amended 1985; repealed, as to future offenses, 1987).
56. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170(d) (West 2003) ("[T]he court may, within 120 days of
the date of commitment .. . recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and
resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he or she had not previously been
sentenced."); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 35(b) (2003) (authorizing resentencing within 120 days after the
sentence is imposed); KAN. ST. § 21-4603(d) (2003) (authorizing modifications of sentences within
120 days after a sentence is imposed); cf. FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (1987) (pre-guidelines rule, now
amended, which allowed resentencing for 120 days). Under some modern "innocence statutes,"
however, courts that are presented with exculpatory DNA evidence are in some cases permitted
to resentence defendants at any time. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512(a), (f)(2) (2003)
(directing courts, in light of exculpatory DNA evidence in rape or murder cases, to "enter any
order that serves the interests of justice, including, but not limited to" an order vacating the
judgment, discharging the petitioner from custody, resentencing him, or granting a new trial);
S.B. 390, 46th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (N.M. 2003) (enacted) (to be codified at N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31la-1) (Michie 2003) (authorizing courts to set aside a judgment, dismiss the charges, or order
other appropriate relief); Wis. STAT. § 974.07(10) (2003) (authorizing court "to enter any order
that serves the interest of justice," including vacating the sentence).
57. There is case law suggesting that the Brady obligations continue during the period after
conviction, but before appeals are complete. See, e.g., Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 819-20
(10th Cir. 1997) (stating that the duty to disclose continues while a direct appeal is pending);
Gauger v. Hendle, No. 99 C 50322, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18002, at *18-19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 24,
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The law on this issue is unsettled. Dicta in the Supreme
60
Court's decision in Imbler v. Pachtman5 9 and a few other cases
provide superficial support for the notion that the obligation to
disclose is perpetual. But no court has directly applied Brady to the
postconviction context, and most courts agree that Brady's
applicability is unsettled even with respect to the period in which
direct appeals are still pending. 61 Nor has any court found any legal
obligation requiring prosecutors to disclose less-than-exculpatory
information-for example, information that simply suggests some
corruption or defect in the conviction process.
2002) (noting that Brady forbids the suppression of exculpatory evidence postconviction);
Monroe v. Butler, 690 F.Supp. 521, 525 (E.D. La. 1988) ("The prosecutor's duty to disclose
material, exculpatory evidence continues through the period allowed by the State for postconviction relief."), affid, 883 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1247 (1988).
58. For purposes of this Article, there is no need to focus on the details of Brady's
requirements, including the elements of materiality and a timely request for information. See,
e.g., Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (refining Brady's materiality requirement);
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434-48 (1995) (explaining materiality); United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 106-09 (1976) (discussing when Brady requires a request by the defendant for the
evidence in question); see also Michael E. Gardner, Note, An Affair to Remember: Further
Refinement of the Prosecutor'sDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 68 Mo. L. REV. 469, 472-74
(2003) (describing the evolution of Brady's requirements). Nor do we need to focus on situations
in which the defendant learns after conviction (and then raises in a collateral proceeding) that
the prosecutor had information at a pre-conviction stage that should have been disclosed. See,
e.g., Monroe v. Blackburn, 476 U.S. 1145, 1147 (1986) (Marshall., J., dissenting) (arguing in favor
of granting habeas relief); State v. Hughes, No. 62884, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS 5277 (Ohio Ct.
App. Nov. 4, 1993) (reversing postconviction relief that had been granted because of a
prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence prior to trial).
59. 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976) ("[A]fter a conviction the prosecutor also is bound by the
ethics of his office to inform the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other information that
casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction.").
60. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987) ("[T]he duty to disclose
[exculpatory information] is ongoing."); Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 820 (10th Cir. 1997)
(stating that the duty to disclose exculpatory information "extends to all stages of the judicial
process"); Monroe v. Butler, 690 F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D. La.), affld, 883 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 487 U.S. 1247 (1988) ("[N]ondisclosure is as unfair where it prevents defendant from
taking full advantage of postconviction relief as it is when it results in the forfeiture of the
defendant's right to a fair trial."); People v. Garcia, 17 Cal.App.4th 1169, 1179-83 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (quoting Imbler for the proposition that the duty of disclosure does not end with the
completion of a trial).
61. See, e.g., Gauger, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18002, at *39 ("The few cases.., simply do not
address the timing question."); Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(holding on appeal that "principles of justice" necessitated a remand to allow DNA tests to be
conducted); see also Todd E. Jaworsky, Note, Defendant's Right to Exculpatory Evidence: Does the
ConstitutionalDuty to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence Extend to New Evidence Discovered Postconviction, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 245, 248-63 (2002) (arguing that the duty to disclose should be
extended to the post-conviction stage); Brian T. Kohn, Brady Behind Bars: the Prosecutor's
Disclosure ObligationsRegarding DNA in the Post-ConvictionArena, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. POLY &
ETHICS 35, 38 (2003) (arguing that, despite contrary case law, "the obligation of prosecutors to
turn over exculpatory evidence extends beyond a defendant's criminal conviction").
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The cases do refer to one postconviction setting in which
Brady's disclosure obligation might apply. When a convicted
defendant files a collateral attack within statutorily prescribed time
limits and the prosecutor comes into possession of exculpatory
evidence that would help the defendant establish an element of the
collateral claim itself, disclosure may be required. 62 On occasion, a
defendant can use this requirement as a bootstrap to obtain disclosure
of exculpatory information relating to the underlying conviction. In
Thomas v. Goldsmith,63 for example, a federal habeas corpus
petitioner sought the production of a semen sample in the prosecutor's
possession to prove that he was innocent of state charges and thereby
could satisfy the "manifest injustice" requirement for federal habeas
corpus relief. While rejecting this broad discovery demand, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the prosecutor was:
under an obligation to come forward with any exculpatory semen evidence in its
possession. See Brady v. Maryland..... We do not refer to the state's past duty to turn
over exculpatory evidence at trial, but to its present duty
to turn over exculpatory
64
evidence relevant to the instant habeas corpus proceeding.

2. The special case of DNA evidence
In recent times, the most highly publicized postconviction
justice issue has been prosecutors' alleged obligation to participate in
identifying DNA evidence that might exonerate defendants convicted
before DNA evidence was available or widely admissible. 65 This issue
62. Thomas v. Goldsmith, 979 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1992).
63. Id. at 746-48.
64. Id. at 749-50; see also Monroe v. Butler, 690 F. Supp. 521, 525 (E.D. La. 1988) (finding a
Brady violation during the pendency of postconviction relief proceedings on the basis that "[tihe
prosecutor's duty to disclose material, exculpatory evidence continues through the period allowed
by the State for post-conviction relief," but denying a request for a new trial); Sewell v. State, 592
N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that exculpatory DNA evidence in the state's
possession, and unavailable to the defendant at trial, is discoverable in collateral attack in order
to challenge a conviction).
65. See generally Keith A. Findley, Learning From Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice
Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. L. REV. 333 (2002) (discussing the role of
prosecutors in bringing to light DNA evidence to exonerate defendants convicted where DNA
evidence was unavailable during their trial); Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 24 (same); Seth F.
Kreimer & David Rudovsky, Double Helix, Double Bind: FactualInnocence and DNA Testing,
151 U. PA. L. REV. 547 (2002) (analyzing and arguing in favor of several possible legal theories
that might support access to DNA for postconviction testing); Daniel S. Medved, The Zeal Deal;
ProsecutorialResistance to Postconviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004)
(examining the "question of why prosecutors may turn a blind eye to postconviction allegations of
innocence"). Much of the interest in the issue has been prompted by the work of the Innocence
Project, which is devoted to addressing cases in which defendants have been falsely identified
and convicted. See Innocence Project, Case Profiles, (providing examples of cases in which
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is distinct from a Brady claim, because Brady involves evidence that a
prosecutor knows to be both material and actually exculpatory.
Genetic samples meet neither requirement until they are tested and
shown to be helpful to the defense. Moreover, Brady requires only that
prosecutors disclose information in their possession, not that they
investigate or order testing that might produce exculpatory evidence
(which is what persons claiming a right to DNA testing usually seek).
Thus, despite the wishes of some courts and commentators to the
contrary, 66 Brady and its progeny alone do not establish a
prosecutorial duty to make genetic samples available for testing or to
67
conduct DNA testing.
Nevertheless, the DNA issue is sui generis, for a variety of
reasons. First, DNA evidence often is more conclusive than other types
of evidence. 68 Second, as a practical matter, recent events have
suggested that the full availability and use of DNA evidence would
.correct a fair number of unjust convictions, particularly in cases that
tend to be among the most serious. 69 Finally, because of the cost of
private genetic testing, in most cases only the government has the
resources to perform the tests. 70 Prosecutors' willingness to release the
samples for testing and/or to authorize government testing therefore
assumes particular significance.
defendants have been falsely identified and convicted) at http://www.innocenceproiect.org (last
visited Mar. 13, 2005).
66. See, e.g., Jennifer Boemer, Other Rising Legal Issues: In the Interest of Justice: Granting
PostconvictionDeoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1971,
1984-85 (2001) (recognizing the uncertainty in the law, but citing cases that involve direct
appeals and collateral attacks for the proposition that courts have applied Brady postconviction);
Cynthia Bryant, Note, When One Man's DNA Is Another Mans Exonerating Evidence:
Compelling Consensual Sexual Partners of Rape Victims to Provide DNA Samples to
Postconviction Petitioners, 33 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 113, 128 (2000): ("The application of
the Brady obligation to requests for postconviction DNA testing is potentially problematic," but
asserting that courts "have granted requests for postconviction DNA testing, however, even in
cases in which the prosecution raised [objections]. Thus, a Brady claim is a feasible means for
requesting postconviction access to crime scene evidence"); cf. Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note
65, at 581 n.134 (stating that "precedent supports an affirmative disclosure obligation when
exculpatory evidence surfaces after conviction.").
67. See, e.g., Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting a claim that DNA
evidence is newly discovered evidence when petitioner had the benefit of "testing using the best
technology available at the time [the] conviction became final").
68. That is, in cases in which identity was an issue.
69. See supra note 21.
70. See, e.g., Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 65, at 561 n.49 (discussing the costs of DNA
testing); Medved, supra note 65, at 149 ("With regard to post-conviction requests for DNA
testing, moreover, the financial costs associated with such tests may concern prosecutors.");
Charlotte J. Word, The Future of DNA Testing and Law Enforcement, 67 BROOK L. REV. 249, 251
(2001) (discussing the current and future costs of DNA testing).
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a. Innocence statutes
Many states have addressed the issue of postconviction
availability of genetic samples and testing through so-called
"innocence" statutes. 7 1 The requirements of these statutes vary, many
limiting applications for relief to felons. 72 All states at a minimum
require applicants to show that identity was in dispute at their trial,
73
that favorable DNA evidence would be relevant and non-cumulative,
71. By most recent count, thirty-six jurisdictions have some form of statute that addresses
the issue of postconviction DNA testing. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240 (2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §16112-201 (2003); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1405 (2003); S.B. 164, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2003)
(enacted) (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT § 18-1-411); 2003 CT. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-582 (West
2003); DEL. CODE. tit. 11, § 4504 (2003); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4133 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
925.11 (West 2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c) (2003); IDAHO CODE § 19-4902 (Michie 2003); 725
ILL. COMP STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-7 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
21-2512 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. § 422.285 (Michie 2003); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 926.1
(West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8201 (2003); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 770.16 (Michie 2003); MINN. STAT. § 590.01 (2003); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 547.035 (2003); H.B. 77, 2003 Leg., 58th Reg. Sess. § 1 (Mo. 2003); NEB. REV. STAT. § 294120 (2003); A.B. 16, 2003 Leg., 72nd Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-32a (West
2003); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-la-2 (2005); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney 2003); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1371 (2003); OR. REV. STAT. § 138.510 et
seq. (2003); PA. CONS. STAT. tit. 42, § 9543.1 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-9.1-11 (2003); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-30-403 (2003); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 64.03 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 78-35a-301 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1 (2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170
(2003); WI. STAT. ANN. § 974.07 (West 2003); see also Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 24, at 396-98
(discussing the different forms of innocence statutes); Diana Kanon, Note, Will the Truth Set
Them Free? No, But the Lab Might: Statutory Responses to Advancements in DNA Technology, 44
ARIZ.L. REV. 467, 471-90 (2002) (discussing the Illinois and New York statutes); Schaffter, supra
note 46, at 709 (discussing limitations of state statutory remedies); Kathy Swedlow, Don't Believe
Everything You Read, A Review of Modern "Postconviction"DNA Testing Statutes, 38 CAL. W. L.
REV. 355, 356-87 (2002) (reviewing innocence statutes and arguing that their effectiveness is
limited by traditional limitations on postconviction relief).
72. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 1405(a) (West 2003) (limiting the statute's effect to persons
in custody, convicted of a felony); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512 (2003) (limiting the statute's effect
to persons in custody, convicted of murder or rape); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285 (Michie 2003)
(limiting the statute's effect to persons sentenced to death for a capital offense); H.B. 77, 2003
Leg., 58th Reg. Sess. § 1 (Mo. 2003) (limiting the statute's effect to incarcerated persons serving
a felony).
73. Some state courts have interpreted these requirements as foreclosing relief to
defendants who confessed or pleaded guilty. See, e.g., State v. Wooten, No. 87S01528DI, 2003
Del. Super. LEXIS 60, at *1-2 (Del. Sup. Ct. Nov. 24, 2003) (holding that defendant's admissions
that the evidence against him was "pretty strong" and that he had committed the acts involved
in a murder and kidnapping meant that testing would not result in new and non-cumulative
evidence); People v. Urioste, 736 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that when
defendant "raised the question of insanity, he necessarily abandoned the question of who
committed the acts charged for purposes of a section 116-3 motion"). But see TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. § 64.03(b) (2003) ("A convicted person who pleaded guilty or nolo contendere in the case
may submit a motion under this chapter, and the convicting court is prohibited from finding that
identity was not an issue in the case solely on the basis of that plea"); People v. Rokita, 736
N.E.2d 205, 211 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (holding that, despite strong evidence of guilt, petitioner was
entitled to DNA testing where identity was at issue at trial and the testing had the potential to
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and that genetic samples are available. 74 In addition, many of the
statutes impose on defendants the obligation to pay for testing unless
they are indigent and, even for indigents, appropriations sometimes
75
are unavailable for testing not directed by a prosecutor's office.
The statutes typically give prosecutors a right to be heard on
all of these issues. 76 Most jurisdictions that have innocence statutes
vest courts with the authority to decide whether testing should be
conducted, but at least one state (Washington) places exclusive
jurisdiction in the hands of prosecutors' offices and the State Attorney
77
General.
produce new, noncumulative evidence materially relevant to the defendant's assertion of actual
innocence).
74. Many innocence statutes include a requirement that biological evidence be preserved for
a particular period of time. E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102jj(b) (2004) (requiring biological
evidence acquired during the investigation to be preserved for the term of defendant's
incarceration); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i) (2003) (requiring the preservation of DNA
evidence for three years after sentencing or the completion of appeals); NEB. REV. STAT. § 294125(1) (2003) (requiring the preservation of DNA evidence during defendant's incarceration));
N.C. GEN. STAT. §15A-268 (2003) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS §10-9.1-11(a) (2003) (same). But see S.B.
164, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Colo. 2003) (enacted) (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT § 18-1411) (stating that there is no duty to preserve or liability for failing to preserve DNA evidence
after conviction). Others simply authorize courts to require the preservation of evidence once an
application for testing is received or require prosecutors to preserve evidence upon notification of
the applicants' requests. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(H) (2003) (authorizing preservation orders);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-7-14 (West 2003) (authorizing preservation orders); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§21-2512(b)(2) (2003) (requiring prosecutors to preserve evidence upon defendant's request); KY.
REV. STAT. § 422.285(6) (Michie 2003) (authorizing preservation orders); MAINE REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15, § 2138(2) (2003) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-la-2 (2005) (same); NEB. REV. STAT. § 294120(3) ("[T]he county attorney shall take such steps as are necessary to ensure that any
remaining biological material that was secured by the state or a political subdivision in
connection with the case is preserved pending the completion of proceedings under the DNA
Testing Act."); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9543.1(b) (West 2003) (requiring a prosecutor upon
receipt of notice that defendant has filed a petition, to preserve all biological evidence); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 40-30-409 (2003) (authorizing preservation orders); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a301(5) (2003) (imposing a duty upon prosecutors to cooperate in preserving evidence once a
petition is filed).
75. Swedlow, supra note 71, at 381; see also N.J. Stat. 2A:84A-32a § (g)(2003) ("The costs of
the DNA testing ordered pursuant to this section shall be borne by the convicted person").
76. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT § 13-4240(B)-(C) (2003); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1405(c)(2),(e) (West
2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 925.11(2)(c) (2003); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-5-41(c)(5) (2003); IND. CODE ANN. §
35-38-7-6 (2003); KY. REV. STAT. § 422.285(2) (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM PROC. § 8-201(d)
(2003); MINN. STAT. §§ 590.01, 590.03 (2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 547.035(3)-(4) (2003); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 440.30 (McKinney 2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-405 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
78-35a-301(5)-(6), 78-35a-303(1) (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-327.1(C) (2003); cf. CAL. PEN.
CODE § 1405(f)(5) (West 2003) ("The court in its discretion may consider any evidence whether or
not it was introduced at trial"); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 770.16(8) (Michie 2003) (requiring courts to
stay an order for a new trial pending results of retesting if the prosecutor does not agree with
results that exonerate the defendant).
77. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2003).
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Most of the modern innocence statutes allow defendants to use
successful results of DNA testing as grounds for filing a motion for
postconviction relief.78 States vary widely, however, in their treatment
of exculpatory results. A few statutes explicitly authorize
postconviction relief even when a new trial motion would normally be
time-barred. 79 Others provide broad authorization for court ordered
relief.8 0 In states without such provisions, it remains unclear whether
a defendant can circumvent a statute of limitations on postconviction
remedies.8 1
78. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. §13-4240(K) (2003) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of
law that would bar a hearing as untimely, if the results of the postconviction deoxyribonucleic
acid testing are favorable to the petitioner, the court shall order a hearing and make any further
orders that are required pursuant to this article or the Arizona rules of criminal procedure");
COLO. REV. STAT § 18-1-410 (2004) (authorizing the use of DNA test results as the grounds for
filing a motion for post-conviction; relief); IDAHO CODE §19-4902(e) (Michie 2003) ("In the
event... DNA test results demonstrate, in light of all admissible evidence, that the petitioner is
not the person who committed the offense, the court shall order the appropriate relief"); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-38-7-19 (West 2003) (notwithstanding any law that would bar a new trial as
untimely, authorizing a court to rely upon favorable DNA testing to order the release of the
defendant upon a joint petition of the defendant and the prosecutor or to order a new trial or any
other relief that it deems appropriate.)
79. KY. REV. STAT. § 422.285(9) (2003); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-30-412 (2003); see also supra
note 76.
80. See, e.g., KAN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2512(f)(2)(B) (Michie 2003) (directing the court to
"enter any order that serves the interests of justice, including, but not limited to," orders
vacating the judgment, discharging petitioners from custody, resentencing petitioner, or granting
a new trial); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-la-2(H) (2005) (stating that reviewing courts "may set aside
the petitioner's judgment and sentence, may dismiss the charges against the petitioner with
prejudice, may grant the petitioner a new trial or may order other appropriate relief"); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 974.07(a)(10) (2003) (authorizing courts to enter any order "that serves the interest
of justice," including vacating the sentence, ordering a new trial or fact-finding hearing,
resentencing, or freeing the defendant from custody); see also IDAHO CODE § 19-4902(e) (Michie
2003) ("In the event that... DNA test results demonstrate, in light of all admissible evidence,
that the petitioner is not the person who committed the offense, the court shall order the
appropriate relief").
81. There are potential costs to defendants who rely upon innocence statutes. The genetic
profile obtained from a defendant can be entered into law enforcement databases, whether or not
the evidence in the defendant's particular case proves exculpatory. See, e.g., IND. CODE. ANN. §
35-38-7-18(2)(b) (2003) ("If the results of the postconviction DNA testing and analysis are not
favorable to the person who was convicted of the offense, the court ... [may issue] an order
requesting that the petitioner's sample be added to the Indiana database"); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
53:1-20.37 (West 2003) (authorizing the state to retain all DNA information from samples taken
pursuant to New Jersey's postconviction DNA testing statute and to use the information in
investigating and prosecuting other crimes); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 411.142 (Vernon 2003)
(authorizing the state DNA database to include results obtained under Texas's postconviction
Some jurisdictions allow unfavorable results to be forwarded to
DNA testing statute).
subsequent parole boards. E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-4240(J) (2003); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-718(2)(a) (2003); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285(8) (West 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-304(1)
(2003). At least one jurisdiction treats a request for testing under a postconviction statute as "a
waiver of any statute of limitations in all jurisdictions as to any felony offense the person has
committed which is identified through DNA database comparison." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-35a-
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b. Case law
In jurisdictions in which innocence statutes are unavailable,
convicted defendants have only two options for obtaining genetic
testing. They can ask prosecutors to undertake testing voluntarily (or
to make samples available for testing) or they can seek judicial relief
through general post-trial (e.g.,habeas corpus or new trial)
mechanisms.8 2 Only one state court has developed case law specifically
addressing the right to obtain testing through collateral proceedings,
holding that "elementary fairness" requires the state to make testing
available in compelling circumstances8 3 in which testing would not
impose "an unreasonable burden on the state."8 4 A few others have
allowed petitioners for new trials to seek discovery in the form of DNA
evidence.8 5 However, most state courts that have addressed the issue
of testing in the context of new trial motions or collateral attacks have
denied relief on the grounds that the motions are time-barred8 6 or that
the evidence would be cumulative 7 or too speculative to overcome the
88
presumption of guilt.
302(3) (2003); cf. William K. Rashbaum, New York Pursues Old Cases of Rape Based Just on
DNA, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2003, at Al (reporting the "John Doe Indictment Project" under which
New York City law enforcement agencies will use DNA profiles to review hundreds of unresolved
sex crimes in an effort to file indictments before the expiration of the statute of limitations).
82. See supra text accompanying note 40.
83. The court specifically referred to the situation in which:
(a) identity of a single perpetrator is at issue; (b) evidence against the defendant is so
weak as to suggest real doubt of guilt; (c)the scientific evidence, if any, used to obtain
the conviction has been impugned; and, (d) the nature of the biological evidence
makes testing results on the issue of identity virtually dispositive.
Jenner v. Dooley, 590 N.W.2d 463, 472 (S.D. 1999).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Reese, 663 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (citing
Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)) (stating that "principles of
justice" allow the defendant to seek after-discovered evidence in new trial proceedings); Sewell v.
State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 707-09 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (holding exculpatory evidence DNA to be
discoverable in a collateral attack challenging the conviction).
86. See, e.g., Dowdell v. State, No. CR-01-0610, 2002 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 150, at *6-7
(Ala. Crim. App. June 28, 2002) (denying a postconviction request for testing relating to a 1986
conviction on the basis that "Alabama courts have recognized the admissibility of DNA since
1991" and that defendant's request ten years subsequently could not be excused).
87. See, e.g., Whitsel v. State, 525 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Iowa 1994) (holding that, because DNA
evidence was not used at trial, "obviously there was sufficient evidence to convict" the
defendant); Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 A.2d 1295, 1297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (holding
other evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction against postconviction challenge).
88. This, of course, places the defendant in the catch-22 situation in which he cannot gain
access to the potentially probative DNA evidence because he cannot establish in advance that it
would be favorable and change the result at trial. See Dowdell, 2002 Ala. Crim. App. LEXIS 150,
at *20 (Baschab, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's denial of discovery means "there is
no mechanism for [the defendant] to challenge his conviction based upon alleged exculpatory
DNA test results").
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The legal obstacles to forcing states without authorizing
statutes to test, or to grant access to, genetic samples8 9 place the
burden of deciding when testing is appropriate squarely on the
shoulders of prosecutors. Prosecutors' offices control the samples and
typically have sole discretion to order government testing. In at least
one jurisdiction, a district attorney's office therefore encourages
petitioners for new trials to contact the individual prosecutors in
charge of their cases in order to explain why they believe DNA testing
89. Professors Seth Kreimer and David Rudovsky have suggested several new legal
theories upon which future courts might grant convicted defendants access to DNA evidence. See
Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 65, at 552, 565-607. First, they rely on Godschalk v.
Montgomery County District Attorney's Office, 177 F.Supp.2d 366, 370 (E.D.Pa. 2001)-a settled
case-for the proposition that defendants might obtain injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983 on
the basis that prosecutors' failure to release genetic samples violates the due process
requirements of Brady v. Maryland. Id.; see also Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-92 (1 1th
Cir. 2002) (remanding for consideration of the §1983 claim); cf. Part III.B.1. (discussing the
reasons why Brady does not directly control the postconviction DNA context). Second, Kreimer
and Rudovsky make a similar argument based on an extension of Brady that there is a separate
constitutional right to "access to evidence." Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 65, at 577-82; see
also Dabbs v. Vergari, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 766-769 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (treating an Article 78
motion as a timely motion for postconviction discovery). Most of the cases that have tested these
two approaches have been rejected on procedural and substantive grounds. E.g., Boyle v. Mayer,
No. 02-3124, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19654, at *3-4 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2002) (holding that
defendant "has not raised a cognizable issue under § 1983 insofar as his claims do not implicate
the validity of his convictions, as such claims would not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation"); Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 340 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
(holding that no § 1983 claim exists for injunctive relief to compel DNA testing unless conviction
has already been invalidated); Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 374, 380 (4th Cir. 2001), reh'g denied,
285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying § 1983 relief because the "proper process for raising
violations of constitutional rights in criminal proceedings cannot be abandoned"); Lee v. Clark
County Dist. Attorney's Office, 145 F.Supp.2d 1185, 1187-88 (D. Nev. 2001) (dismissing a § 1983
complaint as not ripe); State v. El-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d 737, 746 (Neb. 2000) (holding that the
defendant could not bring a claim after the time period for a new trial had run because the
jurisdictional statute specifically required proof of a federal or state constitutional violation);
State v. Frazier, No. 30805884DI, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 474, at *14 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 3,
1995) (finding no interest of justice implicated where defendant did not raise due process claim
in first appeal).
Kreimer and Rudovsky's third theory-that prosecutors who refuse to release genetic
samples effectively bar convicted defendants' access to judicial relief within the meaning of
"access to the courts" precedents-has yet to be considered, but the arguments against its
viability are strong. See Kreimer & Rudovsky, supra note 65, at 568-76 (discussing the
arguments). Kreimer and Rudovsky concede as much. Id. at 569, 587. The few cases that have
focused on access to the courts by incarcerated defendants have, for the most part, centered on
unreasonable actions taken by governmental officials that prevent inmates from filing claims
that other litigants could file. E.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 490 (1983). In the DNA
context, one would have to argue that prosecutorial refusal to provide access to genetic samples
constitutes active interference with access to the courts, that it is arbitrary, and that the similar
denial of access to persons not incarcerated is irrelevant to the claim.
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would help prove their innocence.9 0 As discussed in the following
section, other prosecutors' offices have adopted programs or policies to
govern the exercise of individual prosecutorial discretion.
c. Voluntary programs by prosecutors
Even in states with innocence statutes, prosecutors clearly
have significant influence over the ability of defendants to access and
use DNA evidence. At least one jurisdiction specifically restricts
defendants' ability to apply for DNA testing to applications made to
the Attorney General. 9 1 In states without statutes or case law
providing for postconviction DNA testing, prosecutors alone control
defendants' access to genetic samples and, depending on defendants'
solvency, the ability to conduct tests. 92 In most of these jurisdictions,
prosecutors' decisions are made on an ad hoc basis, by individual
prosecutors deciding on individual requests.
In a few jurisdictions, however, prosecutors' offices have
established policies or programs to govern individual prosecutors'
responses to applications for DNA testing. In 2001, the San Diego
County, California, 9 3 and the Brooklyn, New York, 94 District
Attorneys' offices were the first to undertake voluntary review of
convictions in a limited category of cases in which DNA evidence
might prove relevant. District Attorneys in Oklahoma County,
90. See Mark Lee, Serenity Now or Insanity Later?: The Impact of Post-conviction DNA
Testing on the CriminalJustice System, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 663, 663-664 (2001) (describing a
program of the Suffolk County, Massachusetts, district attorney's office).
91. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.73.170 (2003).
92. One private organization devoted to remedying convictions through the use of
subsequent exculpatory DNA evidence, The Innocence Project, sometimes underwrites the cost of
genetic testing for indigent defendants. The cost of private testing can run upwards of $10,000
per case. Tan, supra note 48, at B04.
93. Charlie Goodyear & Erin Hallissy, Watchdogs Turn to DNA to Prove Innocence, S.F.
CHRONICLE, Jan. 25, 2001, at Al (noting that the San Diego program was the first of its kind).
The San Diego program focuses on persons convicted before 1993, sentenced to life or
indeterminate terms, who consistently have maintained their innocence. H.G. Reza, California
and the West: 12 Inmates' Cases Chosen for Review Under DNA Projects, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18,
2001, at Al. If a case is determined to be worthy of possible DNA testing, the convicted
defendant's defense attorney is contacted. Randy Dotinga, Prosecutors Find Few Cases for DNA
Tests (Dec. 15, 2000), available at http://www.dpinfo.com/DNA.htm. As of April 2002, 560 cases
had been examined and two had qualified for further examination. Reza, supra, at Al.
94. The Brooklyn office agreed to review the cases of all persons still incarcerated who (1)
were convicted of homicides, serious assaults, or sex crimes before 1996, (2) had not confessed or
acknowledged guilt, or been convicted based on overwhelming evidence, and (3) were convicted
under situations in which DNA evidence would have been probative. Daniel Wise, Brooklyn
Prosecutors Find Convictions Pass DNA Tests, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at 1. As of December
2002, this program had not yet resulted in the overturning of any convictions. Sean Gardiner,
Getting It Right; Experts Eye Measures To Prevent Injustice, NEWSDAY, Dec. 11, 2002, at A8.
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Oklahoma 95 and Suffolk County, New York 96 have since established
similar programs.
Following a notorious case in which DNA testing established a
defendant's innocence and led to a scathing audit of the Houston
Police Department's crime laboratory, 97 the Harris County District
Attorney's Office commenced an investigation into all cases in which
DNA evidence had been used to obtain convictions. 98 The Ramsey
County, Minnesota District Attorney's Office has conducted a similar,
but more selective, voluntary review. 99 The Orange County, California
District Attorney's office developed an interactive program, under
which the District Attorney and Public Defender jointly sent
questionnaires to inmates in thirty-three prisons, asking whether they
believe DNA evidence could prove their innocence and basing reviews
of convictions upon the responses. 100
95. Diana Baldwin, Inmates Offered DNA Tests, DAILY OKLAHOMAN, Apr. 12, 2002, at Al.
Under "Project Justice," the Oklahoma D.A.'s office examined 275 rape and murder cases and
excluded 164 in which defendants had confessed, died, or been released or in which no DNA
evidence was available for testing. It then sent qualifying inmates a letter offering the possibility
of having the office conduct DNA testing. Once an offer is accepted, a six-person team consisting
of prosecutors and others is charged with the task of determining whether the defendant would
benefit from testing. Id.; Julie Delcour, Searchingfor Old Truths: ProsecutorsTake Lead in DNA
Reviews, TULSA WORLD, June 23, 2002, at 1.
96. The Suffolk County program responded to the adoption in 1996 of a New York
"innocence statute" allowing for postconviction review of DNA evidence. Rather than waiting for
inmates to make a claim of innocence, the District Attorney announced a voluntary review of the
cases of 734 persons convicted before 1996 who had consistently maintained their innocence.
Tina Kelley, L.I. Prosecutor To Review Cases That DNA Tests Could Reverse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 2000, at B5.
97. See Liptak, supra note 20, at A14 (The audit found "that technicians had misinterpreted
data, were poorly trained and kept shoddy records. In most cases they used up all available
evidence, barring defense experts from refuting or verifying their results. Even the laboratory's
building was a mess, with a leaky roof having contaminated evidence.'.
98. As of June 2003, 369 cases had been identified for retesting by a private laboratory,
with one case already resulting (with the District Attorney's support) in the exoneration and
pardon of a convicted defendant. Roma Khanna, DA Supports Move to Pardon Sutton, HOUSTON
CHRONICLE, June 28, 2003, at Al.
99. The Ramsey County office studied 116 preselected, pre-1995 cases. Jodi Wolgoren,
Prosecutors Use DNA Test to Clear Man in '85 Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2002, at A22.
Prosecutors looked specifically for instances in which the defendant had consistently maintained
innocence, mistaken identity was (in the D.A.'s view) a reasonable possibility, and DNA testing
could provide conclusive exonerating evidence. Paul Gustafson, DNA Exonerates Man Convicted
of '85 Rape, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIBUNE, Nov. 14, 2002, at lA. The office identified three cases
as meriting testing, but found that the genetic samples no longer were available for testing in
two. The third case resulted in exoneration of a defendant convicted of rape in 1985. Id.
100. Strings are attached, however. Inmates requesting assistance must sign a waiver of
their constitutional rights, acknowledge that any information provided or uncovered could result
in charges for other crimes, and agree that any new DNA evidence about them may be entered
into law enforcement databases. Memorandum from Orange County Innocence Project to
Inmates Convicted in Orange County (on file with the author, attached as Appendix 2 to Heather
R. Jones, Prosecutor'sQuest for Justice: Should it Continue After Conviction?, a student paper).
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Although these programs vary in their content and usefulness
to defendants, they share two important characteristics. They each
reflect a policy adopted by a prosecutor's office that governs how the
office should respond, postconviction, to the potential availability of
exculpatory DNA evidence. And they treat like cases alike, rather
than leaving the decision to the fortuity of which individual prosecutor
receives the request for assistance.
C. The Law Governing ProsecutorialPromises
The law governing promises prosecutors make during plea
bargaining is fairly clear. If a promise is significant and a defendant
raises the prosecutor's breach in a timely fashion, courts will allow
defendants to retract their pleas. 10 1 For the most part, however, the
cases have involved breaches of promises that occurred before
sentencing, when courts still had an opportunity to correct errors
before the convictions became finalized.
Two issues arise. First, may a defendant obtain relief for a
broken promise that involves prosecutorial conduct which is to occur
only after the conviction is complete? Second, may a third-party
beneficiary of a prosecutorial promise (such as a family member of a
defendant) take legal action to enforce that promise?
When the prosecutor has promised future governmental action
that is not within her control, courts have proven loathe to enforce the
promise. In Chaipis v. State Liquor Authority,10 2 for example, a
prosecutor guaranteed a defendant pleading guilty that the liquor
license of his restaurant would not be revoked. When the State Liquor
Authority nonetheless revoked the license, the defendant challenged
that action. 10 3 The reviewing court concluded that, because the
prosecutor and Liquor Authority were both state agents, it would be
unfair to allow one to ignore promises made by the other.104
Nevertheless, because the prosecutor exceeded her authority in
making the promise, the court did not feel empowered to force the
As of March 2003, Orange County prosecutors had reviewed the resulting 130 requests from
inmates and approved 20 cases for further review by a neutral panel. H.G. Reza, On the Law:
Project Seeks to Right Wrongful Convictions, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2003, at 2-2.
101. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971) (remanding to state courts
to decide whether circumstances of the case required that there be specific performance of the
agreement on the guilty plea or required that petitioner be granted an opportunity to withdraw
his plea of guilty on grounds that prosecutor had failed to fulfill a promise to recommend a
particular sentence).
102. 375 N.E.2d 32, 34 (N.Y. 1978).
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id. at 36.

2005]

SERVING JUSTICE AFTER CONVICTIONS

201

Liquor Authority's hands. Accordingly, the court simply remanded the
case to the Liquor Authority's administrative processes for
reconsideration. 105
Other cases reflect similar reluctance to enforce excessive
promises. On rare occasion, courts have allowed defendants to retract
their pleas, even after the ordinary time for doing so has expired. 10 6
More frequently, however, courts have responded in the fashion of
Rise v. Board of Parole,10 7 in which the Supreme Court of Oregon
declined to enforce in any way a prosecutor's promise that the parole
board would treat defendant's crime leniently. Finding the
prosecutor's promise ultra vires, the court held that it supported
neither a challenge to the parole board's decision nor a judicial
decision to allow the defendant to retract his plea out of time.10 8
Courts are somewhat more willing to grant relief, particularly
the relief of vacating a plea agreement, when a prosecutor fails to
fulfill a promise that she can, as a practical matter, carry out
personally. Thus, for example, the failure to arrange for promised
drug or mental health treatment has resulted in the vacating of
convictions. 10 9 Likewise, when federal prosecutors have exhibited bad
faith in failing to file substantial assistance motions seeking sentence
reductions for cooperating witnesses under the federal sentencing
guidelines, some courts have intervened. 110 Even with respect to such
forward-looking promises, however, the courts rarely have ordered
105. Id. at 37.
106. See, e.g., Property Clerk v. Ferris, 570 N.E.2d 225, 228 (N.Y. 1991) (stating that, where
property clerk refused to honor prosecutor's promise to release defendant's car from custody, "if
the defendant was misled by the prosecutor's promise, he could move to vacate the guilty plea
and be restored to his preplea position").
107. 745 P.2d 1210, 1215 (Or. 1973).
108. Id. at 1212-13; see also United States v. Tursi, 576 F.2d 396, 398-99 (1st Cir. 1978)
(declining to vacate plea based on prosecutor's unfulfilled promise that defendant's son would be
sentenced as a youthful offender on basis that the defendant knew the prosecutor had no power
to bind the court in sentencing).
109. See, e.g., Hunter v. State, 477 N.E.2d 317, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (remanding to give
the defendant an opportunity "to prove his guilty plea was tainted by a promise of [drug and
alcohol] treatment which induced the plea" and thereby show that his plea lacked voluntariness);
People v. Cortez, 91 Cal. Rptr. 660, 670 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970) (allowing withdrawal of plea when
treatment in a hospital setting proved unworkable); cf. State v. Parker, 334 Md. 576, 607 (Md.
1994) (holding that where state prosecutor's promise regarding federal incarceration could not be
fully carried out, the appropriate remedy was to give defendant the option of being transferred
back to state authorities at the end of the federal sentence or to allow withdrawal of the plea).
110. See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 33 F.3d 130, 133 (1st Cir. 1994) (stating that courts
can review failures to file substantial assistance motions only when prosecutors are alleged to
have been "motivated by an unconstitutional purpose such as racial discrimination"), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1098 (1995).
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specific performance.1 1 1 In the sentencing guideline scenario, courts
also have accorded prosecutors broad discretion in determining what
their promises require, so long as the prosecutors have acted in good
faith. 112 The same holds true in the few available cases in which third
parties have sought to enforce promises made to a defendant during
3
plea bargaining. 11
These precedents suggest that courts ordinarily will not impose
legal obligations upon prosecutors to fulfill their promises. Moreover,
it is important to note that the cases involving promises that exceed
prosecutors' powers1 14 do not focus on whether the prosecutor in
question made reasonable efforts to fulfill the promises. The courts
seem to have left the sufficiency of the prosecutorial effort for
prosecutors themselves to determine. In doing so, the cases do not
render the prosecutorial promises nugatory, but they do typically
11 5
leave the promises for individual prosecutors to honor in good faith.
111. But cf. United States v. Nelson, 717 F. Supp. 682, 685 (D. Minn. 1989) (finding
authority for a court to order specific performance of a plea promise).
112. See, e.g., United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 96, 99-100 (2d Cir. 1996) (upholding a
prosecutor's decision not to file a substantial assistance motion); United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d
1492, 1504 (11th Cir. 1993) (recognizing a prosecutor's discretion not to file a substantial
assistance motion); United States v. Rexach, 896 F.2d 710, 713-15 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding a
refusal to file a substantial assistance motion as in good faith), cert denied, 498 U.S. 969 (1990);
see also Bennett Gershman, The Most FundamentalChange in the Criminal Justice System: The
Role of the Prosecutor in Sentence Reduction, 5 CRIM. JUST. 2, 7 (1990) (discussing the extent of
prosecutors' discretion).
113. In Northeast Motor Co. v. North Carolina State Board of Alcohol, for example, a
restaurant employee had pleaded guilty on condition that the state would not take any further
action against the employee or his employer. 241 S.E.2d 727, 728-29 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978). When
the Board of Alcohol Control suspended the employer's liquor license, the employer filed a civil
action seeking to enjoin the suspension on the basis of the prosecutor's promise to the employee.
Id. The Court held that, because the third-party employer had not given up any of his own
rights in exchange for the prosecutor's promise, he was not entitled to specific performance. Id.
at 730.
One might expect to find cases in which prosecutors have made promises to defendants or
prospective witnesses not to prosecute, or to prosecute leniently, family members associated with
the crime. Most of the cases involving such scenarios, however, focus on whether a defendant's
plea is rendered involuntary because of the coercive effect of the prosecutor's threat to proceed
against the family members. See, e.g., Pollitte v. United States, 852 F.2d 924, 930 (7th Cir. 1988)
(upholding plea conditioned on lenient treatment of defendant's wife); Herman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d
834, 837 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding plea conditioned on dismissal of indictment against
defendant's wife); cf. Martin v. Kemp, 760 F.2d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 1985) (holding that plea
conditioned upon release of defendant's pregnant wife might be involuntary if the prosecutor had
no probable cause to charge the wife); Allyn v. Comm'r of Corr. Servs., 708 F. Supp. 592, 593-94
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding voluntary an agreement to plead in exchange for no prison time for
defendant's daughter).
114. See supra text accompanying note 102.
115. See Ross Galin, Note, Above the Law: The Prosecutor's Duty to Seek Justice and the
Performance of Substantial Assistance Agreements, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1283-84 (2000)
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D. The Law GoverningProsecutorialInvolvement in Ancillary
Proceedings
Specific rules govern the involvement of prosecutors in
proceedings related to their caseloads in a capacity other than as a
lawyer for the government. 116 These rules mostly affect part-time and
special prosecutors, 1 7 prosecutors who have left the prosecution
corps, 18 and lawyers who have joined prosecutors' offices after being
involved in related matters in their private practices." 9 The rules
(discussing prosecutors' ethical obligation to fulfill promises to file substantial assistance
motions).
116. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11 (regulating government lawyers).
117. See, e.g., Hopkins v. State, 429 So. 2d 1146, 1154 (Ala. Crim. App. 1983) ("a special
prosecutor's employment by the victim to represent him in a civil action arising out of the same
transaction as the criminal proceeding does not deprive the defendant of a fair trial"); State v.
Eldridge, 951 S.W.2d 775, 776-777 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997) ("We find the prosecutorial
participation of attorneys who also represented the victim in a pending civil lawsuit arising from
the same incident violated defendant's due process rights and was prejudicial to the judicial
process."). For a collection of cases in which part-time prosecutors have been disciplined for
participating in criminal cases on both sides or in criminal and civil actions arising from the
same facts, see Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV.
721, 724 n.7 (2001). See also Andrew Sidman, Comment, The Outmoded Concept of Private
Prosecution, 25 AM. U. L. REV. 754, 773-80 (1976) (discussing ethical problems inherent in the
use of private prosecutors); Richard H. Underwood, Part-time Prosecutors and Conflicts of
Interest: A Survey and Some Proposals, 81 KY. L.J. 1, 1-10 (1993) (surveying cases); cf. Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 790 (1987) (holding "that counsel for a
party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed to undertake contempt
prosecutions for alleged violations of that order" because such counsel serve as government
attorneys and must be disinterested); United States v. Time, 21 F.3d 635, 640 (5th Cir. 1994)
(upholding the appointment of a criminal prosecutor to act as a special prosecutor to try criminal
contempt charges against defense lawyers in the underlying criminal case).
118. E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 207 (2003) (imposing limits on practice by former federal government
attorneys); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11(a) (regulating representation by former
government attorneys); see also Irving Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the
Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REV. 657, 659-69 (1957) (discussing the departing
lawyer's obligation of loyalty to the government); Lacovara, Restricting the Private Practice of
Former Government Lawyers, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 369, 387-90 (1978) (discussing restrictions on the
practice of former government lawyers); cf. Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 443-44 (2d Cir.
1980) (approving screening of former government lawyer in a subsequent related civil matter),
vacated on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981).
119. E.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.11(c) (regulating government lawyers
based on their prior practice); see People v. Shinkle, 415 N.E.2d 909, 910-11 (N.Y. 1980)
(reversing conviction because of Chief Assistant District Attorney's former representation of
defendant); see also United States v. Tierney, 947 F.2d 854, 865 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
participation of prosecutor's former firm in representing the insurer of a tax fraud defendant did
not require his disqualification); Wilkins v. Bowersox, 933 F. Supp. 1496, 1523 (W.D. Mo. 1996)
(finding impropriety in allowing former defense counsel to proceed as a prosecutor in subsequent
death penalty case), affd, 145 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 525 U.S. 1094 (1999); cf.
United States v. Wencke, 604 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding prosecutor's prior
involvement in civil litigation as counsel for the S.E.C. did not require his disqualification from
the criminal case); State v. Bolton, 905 F.2d 319, 321-22 (10th Cir. 1990) (not disqualifying a
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typically regulate conflicts of interest, the disclosure of confidential
material (either the government's or that of private parties), and the
danger that prosecutors will use their office to feather their own nests
or to engage in vendettas. 120 A full discussion of these regulations is
beyond this Article's purview, because the Article focuses on
prosecutorial obligations per se.
This Article has, however, noted other scenarios in which
prosecutors, while still prosecutors, might become involved in
complementary or supplemental proceedings-as a lawyer for the
government, as a witness, or as a provider of information. 12 1 Whether
the prosecutor should, or must, participate implicates concerns of
fairness (to the defendant and victims), the benefits and costs of
participation to the state, and conceptions of prosecutors' appropriate
roles.
Almost no case law exists in which courts have reviewed
prosecutorial participation in related ancillary proceedings. Indirectly,
by according prosecutors immunity against sanctions, a few courts
have recognized prosecutorial discretion to participate in parole and
postconviction relief proceedings. 122 In Mosier v. State Board of
Pardons and Paroles, for example, the court immunized prosecutors
for a variety of conduct taken in connection with a convicted
defendant's parole hearing, including describing aspects of the crime,
characterizing defendant's personality, and submitting evidence
seized in the original investigation.1 23 Other courts have applied
prosecutor because of prior representation of defendant in an unrelated matter), cert denied, 489
U.S. 1029 (1991).
120. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS

378-84 (6th ed. 2002) (discussing the dangers of allowing government attorneys to engage in civil
practice related to their criminal cases); Matthew S. Nichols, No One Can Serve Two Masters:
Arguments Against Private Prosecutors, 13 CAP. DEF. J. 279, 282-83 & nn. 15-17 (2001)
(discussing cases and statutes forbidding prosecutors to act as counsel in civil cases involving the
same facts as a criminal case in which they have been involved).
121. See supra text accompanying notes 30.
122. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kegans, 870 F.2d 992, 996-98 (5th Cir. 1989) (applying immunity in
suit against prosecutor for opposing defendant's parole); Sinclair v. State ex rel. Dept. of Public
Safety and Corr., 769 So. 2d 1270, 1271-73 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (according a prosecutor absolute
immunity against claim that he disseminated false information during an appearance to oppose
parole before the Louisiana Board of Parole); cf. Allen v. Thompson, 815 F.2d 1433, 1434 (11th
Cir. 1987) (stating that forwarding information about appellant at the U.S. Parole Commission's
request is "so intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process as to cloak the
prosecutors with absolute immunity from suits for damages").
123. 445 S.E.2d 535, 537 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Allen v. Thompson, 815 F.2d 1433,
1434 (11th Cir.1987)); see also Harris v. Menendez, 817 F.2d 737, 741-42 (11th Cir. 1987)
(approving dismissal of complaint against prosecutor for conspiring to have defendant's
probation improperly revoked); Hamilton v. Daley, 777 F.2d 1207, 1213 (7th Cir. 1985)
("Probation revocation is a criminal proceeding. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from suit for
initiating a prosecution and presenting the state's case.").
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identical reasoning to clemency 124 and probation revocation
proceedings. 125 They have accorded the immunity both to active
prosecutorial opposition to post-trial release and to prosecutors'
126
refusal to take a position favorable to a convicted defendant.
Courts have reached similar conclusions when defendants have
sought to penalize prosecutors for participating in ancillary mental
health proceedings. 127 Other courts have immunized the action of
prosecutors who have sought civil commitment of an arrested
defendant to an alcohol detox center1 28 and, in one unpublished
opinion, additional confinement under violent sexual offender laws for
a defendant who had completed his sentence for the underlying
crime. 129 Although none of these cases involve efforts to force
prosecutors to join, or to prevent prosecutors from joining, ancillary
proceedings, 130 the gist of the judicial grants of immunity seems to be
1 31
that participation is a matter of prosecutorial discretion.
124. E.g., Lucien v. Preiner, 967 F.2d 1166, 1167 (7th Cir. 1992) (immunizing a prosecutor
who sent a letter opposing clemency on the basis that "a determination of executive clemency,
like a parole decision, is an extension of the sentencing process" and that the "state's attorney is
performing a prosecutorial duty when she helps the court ascertain the appropriate sentence for
a particular defendant, and she continues to do so when defending that sentence if it is
challenged").
125. E.g., Cooney v. Park County, 792 P.2d 1287, 1299 (Wyo. 1990) (applying "sovereign
immunity from civil liability with the exception of certain conduct for which that immunity is
specifically waived").
126. See, e.g., Loveridge v. Schillberg, 561 P.2d 1107, 1109 (Wash. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting
actions by defendants against prosecutors who had failed to recommend release to parole board,
on the basis that the activities encompassed by the complaint were "quasi-judicial in nature").
127. In Marczeski v. Handy, for example, a defendant who had been found incompetent and
been committed to a mental institution sued a prosecutor for supporting the commitment. 213 F.
Supp. 2d 135, 136-37 (D. Conn. 2002). The federal district court dismissed the complaint on the
basis that the prosecutor's actions were "intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process." Id. at 141; accord In re Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 909-10 (10th Cir. 2000)
(holding in part that the prosecutor "was acting pursuant to her statutory obligation to conduct
the commitment proceedings ...and she is absolutely immune from suit concerning her actions
and omissions related to the fulfillment of that obligation."); cf. Byrne v. Kysar, 347 F.2d 734,
736 (7th Cir. 1965) ("[Ilf it be considered that [the state's attorney] acted in his official capacity
as a prosecutor for the state he is afforded the same [absolute immunity] given a judge").
128. Dick v. Watonwan County, 551 F.Supp. 983, 992-93 (D. Minn. 1982).
129. Diestelhorst v. Ryan, 20 Fed.Appx. 544, 547 (7th Cir. 2001).
130. In the one case in which a prosecutor's standing to participate in civil commitment
proceedings was directly challenged, the court first noted that there was no express statutory
provision allowing or forbidding participation by the prosecuting attorney in the proceedings, but
interpreted the commitment statute's designation of the prosecutor as a person entitled to notice
of the potential discharge of a mentally ill or mentally retarded person as implying a right to
participate. In re Elmore, 468 N.E.2d 97, 100-01 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983). The Court next considered
a statute that provided "that a designee of the Director of Mental Retardation and
Developmental Disabilities shall 'present the case on behalf of the state' except with respect to
respondents found not guilty by reason of insanity, in which event the 'prosecutors shall present
the evidence.' " Id. at 101. The court concluded that this statute did not foreclose "the
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There are a few cases addressing prosecutorial participation in
ordinary civil proceedings related to ongoing criminal prosecutions.
One court has held directly that a prosecutor may participate in civil
proceedings on behalf of the government so long as those proceedings
are reasonably related to her public functions. 132 The ability of a
prosecutor to act in this way, however, may depend on her statutory
authority. 133 Courts also have sent mixed signals on the question of
whether prosecutors may condition their decisions in criminal
prosecutions on defendants' willingness to forgo parallel civil suits
(e.g., against the municipality).1 34 The only legal principle that seems
clear is that when prosecutors may participate in civil lawsuits or civil
aspects of criminal proceedings, they are subject to ordinary ethics
rules governing all lawyers, including the prohibition against using
prosecutor from attending and participating in [all types of commitment] hearings." Id. The
court accordingly found "no error or abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in
permitting the prosecutor to participate in the proceedings and to examine witnesses and
present evidence." Id.
131. Cf. State v. Williamson, 853 P.2d 56, 59 (Kan. 1993) (recognizing prosecutorial
discretion to decide whether to pursue criminal prosecution or civil commitment).
132. People v. Parmar, 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 31, 43-44 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001).
133. See, e.g., id. at 43 (referring to a statute assigning to the district attorney "some civil
law duties"); Czajka v. Breedlove, 613 N.Y.S.2d 741, 742-43 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding that
the county law, "which establishes the primary duties of a District Attorney, d[id] not explicitly
grant the power to institute [a] civil suit" to compel a criminal defendant to honor her plea
agreement to resign from the police force); cf. Michigan ex rel. Oakland County Prosecutor v.
Dep't of Corr., 503 N.W.2d 465, 470 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (rejecting a prisoner's claim that
because the Board of Commissioners had counsel to represent the county in civil matters, a
prosecutor could not bring a civil action "to rescind a prisoner's discharge due to the Department
of Correction's incorrect method of calculating good-time unless the board specifically authorized
the action.").
134. In Sassower v. City of White Plains, for example, a federal district court found the
"practice of trading retaliatory prosecutions for releases from civil liability" to be "unethical." 742
F.Supp. 157, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In contrast, McGruder v. Necaise agreed that this practice is
"reprehensible," but nevertheless accorded absolute immunity to a district attorney who had
offered to drop criminal charges against a defendant in exchange for dismissal of a civil action
relating to a jail fire. 733 F.2d 1146, 1147-48 (5th Cir. 1984). Other courts have expressed a
variety of opinions on the same subject. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 375 (9th
Cir. 1970) (holding that a prosecutor may not "condition a voluntary dismissal of a charge upon a
stipulation by the defendant that is designed to forestall the latter's civil case"); State v.
Simmelink, 668 P.2d 477, 478 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a deputy district attorney's offer
to dismiss the charge against a defendant in exchange for his signing a release in a related civil
action against the police might have been unethical but was not enough by itself to justify
dismissal of the charges); cf. United States. v. Andreadis, 234 F.Supp. 341, 346 (E.D.N.Y. 1964)
(noting that if the government's sole purpose in conducting depositions in a civil matter was to
obtain evidence for a criminal prosecution, this might constitute an abuse of process).
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the threat of criminal proceedings solely for the purpose of gaining an
advantage in a civil matter.135
Most of the cases discussed above involve prosecutors' conduct
as lawyers in the ancillary proceedings. A few of the parole cases
involve participation as a provider of information. Opinions detailing
attempts by defendants or third parties to enlist the assistance of
prosecutors as witnesses do not seem to exist. When, whether, and
how prosecutors may involve themselves in secondary capacities in
ancillary proceedings thus again seem to be matters that are left
36
largely to a prosecutor's individual discretion.'
IV. WAYS PROSECUTORS AND RULEMAKERS MIGHT THINK ABOUT THE
POSTCONVICTION OBLIGATION TO SERVE JUSTICE

Part III's analysis of prosecutors' legal obligations illustrates
that decisional and statutory law do not provide prosecutors with
much guidance for the range of postconviction scenarios this Article
has identified. For the most part, courts and legislatures accord
prosecutors significant discretion regarding whether
to take
postconviction action and in deciding what those actions should be. At
the trial stage, the adversarial system serves as a touchstone for
prosecutorial decisionmaking. 137 At the plea-bargaining stage, a
variety of possible frameworks exist that can help provide
decisionmaking standards. 38 Although standards are perhaps even
more important at the postconviction stage,' 39 it turns out to be more
135. See, e.g., In re Schake, 154 B.R. 270, 275 (D. Neb. 1993) (stating that prosecutors may
not threaten to bring criminal charges for the sole purpose of gaining advantage for third parties
in a bankruptcy matter because that would violate ethics standards.)
This author has not found any case law involving full-time prosecutors who have
participated directly in helping victims sue criminal defendants, but there is some suggestion in
the case law that prosecutors must at least inform defendants, when they know, that
complaining witnesses plan to file a civil action. See, e.g., People v. Wallert, 469 N.Y.S.2d 722,
724-25 (N. Y. App. Div. 1983) (holding that prosecutor had a duty at least to submit to the court
the question of whether he should disclose his knowledge that the complainant in a rape
prosecution was awaiting the outcome of the criminal trial before filing an $18 million damage
action).
136. Cf. People v. Pensinger, 805 P.2d 899, 933-34 (Cal. 1991) (leaving open the possibility
that the prosecutor could properly have promised a potential witness that he would intervene
and try to assist him in separate child custody proceedings).
137. See Zacharias, Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice,supra note 4, at 65 (focusing on
the prosecutor's obligation to do justice given the assumptions of the adversarial system in which
she is a participant).
138. See Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, supra note 4, at 1183 (suggesting that
prosecutors can best understand their priorities in plea bargaining "by identifying the model, or
theory, of plea bargaining under which they operate").
139. See supra text accompanying note 7.
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challenging to pinpoint a governing theoretical construct. Not only
does the background law fail to set parameters, but there also is no
ongoing legal decisionmaking process through which boundaries for
prosecutorial conduct will develop over time.
In an attempt to offer a useful analysis, this Section of this
Article divides into four groups the various considerations that might
be relevant to prosecutorial decisionmaking. First, there are factors
that stem from prosecutors' legal obligations. Second, there is a series
of potential considerations relating to defendants' blameworthiness. A
third set of factors centers on the proper role of prosecutors in the
postconviction decisionmaking process. Finally, there are numerous
specific criteria or questions that prosecutors might need to address
that do not fit within the first three categories.
At this juncture, this Article simply attempts to highlight and
categorize
the issues that
are relevant to prosecutorial
decisionmaking-sometimes noting pertinent normative arguments,
but more typically avoiding prescriptions. The goal in grouping these
considerations is to find a middle ground between specifying a single
touchstone, or framework, for resolving postconviction justice issues
and offering no guidance whatsoever. As the final section of the Article
will suggest, developing the categories may help rulemakers set initial
guidelines for prosecutorial decisionmaking with respect to factors
within the categories. At a minimum, the categorization opens the
debate regarding how the factors should be taken into account.
A. The Spirit of the Case Law
In Imbler v. Pachtman,140 the Supreme Court stated that, even
in the absence of any constitutional obligation to disclose exculpatory
information, a prosecutor "is bound by the ethics of his office to inform
the appropriate authority of after-acquired or other information that
casts doubt upon the correctness of the conviction."' 41 Likewise, in the
cases involving prosecutorial promises in the course of plea
bargaining, courts that have declined to enforce those promises have
relied upon "good faith" prosecutorial efforts to achieve appropriate
results.' 42 The core of these decisions is that the same sense of fair
play that requires particular prosecutorial conduct at the preconviction stage continues after conviction, but that the fact of
140. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
141. Id. at 427 n.25 (emphasis added).
142. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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conviction sometimes changes the equity calculus or limits the courts'
authority to grant a legal remedy.143
These cases suggest that prosecutors should not view the scant
precedent as obviating postconviction obligations to disclose
exculpatory evidence, keep promises, and abide by other pretrial due
process requirements (such as safeguarding fair access to the courts).
The spirit underlying the pre-conviction law remains in effect, with
the courts simply recognizing a greater measure of prosecutorial
discretion. The message of the case law is that prosecutors should
exercise their discretion by considering what special postconviction
factors militate against implementing the ordinary fairness concerns.
It is important to note that the mere fact of conviction and the
resulting presumption of guilt will not automatically control this
calculation. Procedural impediments to new trials already protect the
presumption, even after new evidence is uncovered or disclosed.' 4 4
Thus, as a general matter, prosecutors need to make case-specific
assessments of the underlying fairness concerns (e.g., the risk of a
faulty conviction, fair access to justice, whether the prosecutor has the
sole ability to facilitate a fair result) and must weigh those against the
specific postconviction factors (e.g., the importance of maintaining
finality, resource considerations, and the likelihood that the result is
45
fair) that militate against prosecutorial action.1
B. The Issue of Defendant's Guilt
Despite the conclusion just noted, the weight prosecutors give
to a prior finding of guilt does drive most postconviction decisions.
This factor clearly is relevant to cases that call upon a prosecutor to
revisit a defendant's conviction. Yet a prosecutor's belief in a
defendant's blameworthiness may also affect that prosecutor's
resolution of matters in which the defendant's culpability is not in
issue. The following pages first consider the presumption of guilt from
the perspective of the prosecutor deciding whether to reopen a
conviction and then analyze the weight the prosecutor should attach
to the presumption of guilt in other contexts.
143. See, e.g., Monroe v. Butler, 690 F.Supp. 521, 525 (E.D. La.) (equating fairness in
disclosure of exculpatory evidence pre-conviction and fairness in enabling defendants to "tak[e]
full advantage of post-conviction relief"), affl'd, 883 F.2d 331 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1247
(1988); cf. Jaworsky, supra note 61, at 258 ("[Tlhere is no valid reason why a defendant's due
process right to exculpatory evidence should end following conviction").
144. See supra text accompanying notes 45.
145. Cf. Kreimer and Rudovsky, supra note 65, at 563 (questioning some prosecutors'
overemphasis of administrative and finality concerns in postconviction cases involving DNA
evidence).
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The presumption actually encompasses two aspects. Once a
defendant has been tried and has exhausted his appeals, the criminal
justice system is prepared to assume both that the defendant received
fair process and that the process resulted in an accurate judgment.
Most prosecutors would agree that this presumption should
give way in extreme circumstances. A prosecutor who knows for a fact
that a convicted defendant is innocent should take some action. No
conception of the prosecutor's role-as an advocate, defender of the
public trust, or protector of victims-would countenance the
prosecutor's participation in keeping a clearly innocent person
incarcerated.
In most situations, however, new information will not take a
prosecutor to that level of certainty. As partisan representatives of the
state, prosecutors never are required to give defendants the same
benefit of the doubt that other actors in the legal system accord (e.g.,
through the pre-conviction presumption of innocence). Ethics rules
initially allow prosecutors to proceed towards a conviction so long as
146
they have "probable cause" to believe that a defendant is guilty.
Once the defendant is convicted, the criminal law shifts the
presumption to one disfavoring the defendant, 47 so presumably a
prosecutor also is entitled to adopt a less defendant-protective posture.
The questions that remain are what that posture should be and how
much emphasis prosecutors should place on it.
146. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 ("The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause"); ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function and Def. Function,
Standards 3-3.9(a) (1977) ("A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit
the continued pendency of criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not
supported by probable cause.").
147. Thus, for example, the presumption regarding eligibility for bail typically is reversed
after conviction, while defendant awaits the results of his appeals. See 18 U.S.C.A. §
3143(a)(1),(b)(1)(A)-(B) (2004) (providing that a convicted defendant is not entitled to bail unless
the court makes a specific finding that he is not likely to flee or to pose a danger if released, that
the appeal is not for the purposes of delay, and that the appeal has substantial merit); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 12.4(d) at 661 (3d ed. 2003) ('The typical state
constitutional provision guaranteeing a right to bail is limited to the time 'before conviction"');
see also United States v. Austin, 614 F. Supp 1208, 1211-12 (D.N.M. 1985) ("Unlike bail prior to
trial, there is no common law, constitutional or statutory right to bail pending appeal"); cf.
Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5 (1964) (chambers decision by Douglas, J.) (holding that when an
applicant for bail pending postconviction proceedings "has been tried, convicted, and sentenced
by a court of law ... [iut is obvious that a greater showing of special reasons for admission to bail
pending review should be required"); Landano v. Rafferty, 970 F.2d 1230, 1240-42 (3d Cir. 1992)
(reversing a grant of bail pending habeas corpus review because of the absence of "extraordinary
circumstances" justifying bail after conviction), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 955 (1992).
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1. Problem one: identifying the presumption of guilt
There is a range of "presumptions of guilt" that prosecutors
might apply. Prosecutors might carry forward the pre-conviction
standard: they should help a defendant avoid (or void) his conviction
only when they no longer have probable cause (i.e., a good reason to
believe the defendant is guilty). Prosecutors might raise the standard:
they should help defendant only if they no longer have any reason to
believe in the validity of the conviction, not even a suspicion that
defendant remains guilty. Alternatively, prosecutors might reverse the
presumption to one focusing on innocence. Prosecutors might avoid
defense-oriented action unless they "are almost certain," "strongly
believe," "believe," "have reason (or probable cause) to believe," or
"suspect" that a defendant is innocent.
Unlike with the professional rules governing the level of belief
a prosecutor should maintain pre-conviction--which are based, in
part, on the adversary system's conception of the prosecutor's role as
advocate and the system's core assumption that fair process will
correct prosecutorial misjudgments 14 8 -it is difficult to identify a
neutral principle for selecting one of the available postconviction
standards. Arguments for particular standards based on proponents'
varying emphases on the competing notions that "it is important for
an innocent person not to be punished," that "defendant had his
chance to prove his innocence," and that "it is important to preserve
the finality of legitimate convictions" are equally compelling.
Consider a few of the options. Would it make sense, for
example, for a prosecutor to adopt the position that she will not take
action unless new information removes her probable cause to believe
that defendant is guilty? Ordinarily, the fact of a judgment of
conviction alone provides probable cause, just as in the pre-conviction
context an indictment by a grand jury ordinarily substitutes for a
prosecutor's need to present probable cause before a defendant can be
arraigned. 149 Under this postconviction standard, new information
would move a prosecutor only when it eliminates the evidence that
148. See Zacharias, Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice, supra note 4, at 56-57 ("Courtenforced constitutional safeguards... arguably suffice to protect the innocent"); see also H.
Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard: Guidance from the
ABA, 71 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1168 (1973) (cautioning that the prosecutor, in seeking to serve
justice, should not "regard himself as the sole arbiter of truth and justice").
149. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 147, § 15.5(a), at 770-71 (reviewing authorities to the effect
that an indictment returned by a properly constituted grand jury conclusively determines the
existence of probable cause); Alexander Holtzoff, Codification of Federal Criminal Procedure, 4
F.R.D. 275, 286 (1946) (stating that a grand jury indictment is deemed conclusive proof of
probable cause).
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previously existed. Supplemental contradictory evidence might
increase the controversy and strengthen the defendant's arguments,
but it usually cannot destroy the reason to believe that defendant
might be guilty.
One can question this standard on several grounds. First, it
does not distinguish between the two aspects of the presumption of
guilt. It only considers whether the new evidence undermines the
assumption that the verdict was correct, not whether the process itself
was flawed.1 50 That is significant for two reasons. A lack of fairness in
the process may not, alone, eliminate the possibility of guilt but may
infect the accuracy of the verdict. Therefore, to rely on the verdict as
an accurate indicator of probable cause seems questionable. Moreover,
to the extent the prosecutor's office itself was partly responsible for
assuring a fair process,1 5 1 the new information may reflect the original
prosecutor's failure to screen the case properly. Adopting a stricter
postconviction screening criterion may leave the system with the
prosecutor's function unfulfilled.
One might conclude from this that prosecutors should
distinguish between new information that simply goes to the evidence
(in which case they should use the probable cause standard) and new
information that calls the fairness of the earlier trial process into
question. As a practical matter, well-funded defendants often will be
able to produce some new evidence, so there is good reason to adopt a
rule that imposes an obstacle to undoing convictions on factual
grounds. That is the justification for judicial standards that limit the
52
availability of new trials based on newly-discovered evidence.'
On the other hand, the adversarial system to some extent
places the burden of ferreting out flaws in the process and untruthful
evidence on defense counsel. The fact that a prosecutor learns of
corruption or the fact that a witness may have lied does not
automatically mean the trial itself was unfair. Prosecutors thus might
be justified in adopting a middle-ground approach, asking whether
defense counsel could have discovered or tested the newly received
information at the time of the trial. This compromise has the virtue of
according the trial process respect, but only to the extent it deserves
respect. Yet the approach is prone to the criticism that the resolution
of the prosecutor's postconviction quandary becomes technical or
150. The process might have been flawed, for example, because of police corruption or
because of defects in the evidence-gathering process.
151. See generally Zacharias, Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice, supra note 4 (arguing
that prosecutors have a significant role to play in making sure that adversarial process is
working in its intended fashion).
152. See supra text accompanying note 45.
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game-like, looking primarily to whether the defendant had a fair
opportunity to play the game rather than to the merits of whether his
incarceration is factually justified.
A second reason to question reliance on a probable cause
standard is theoretical. The symmetry of adopting the pre-conviction
standard may honor form over substance. The justification for the low
pre-conviction standard for prosecutorial action against defendants is
the assumption that the adversarial process will compensate for
prosecutors' errors in judgment. One cannot make the same
assumption about a prosecutor's postconviction conclusions because
the prosecutor may be the decisionmaker of last resort.
Consider
an
alternative,
process-based
justification:
prosecutors should adopt a probable cause or even less defendantprotective standard because the burden of retrying the defendant 153
and the costs of doing so 154 present practical reasons to disfavor
prosecutorial action. When the prosecutor is so certain of the
defendant's innocence that she is willing to set him free, then the
standard would be met. But when a prosecutor's confidence in the
verdict is only shaken to the extent that she thinks a retrial might be
worthwhile, a bright-line rule against retrials is warranted.
The obvious difficulty of this approach is that it is artificial. It
balances practical concerns against claims to fairness. Adopting a
bright-line rule risks overemphasizing the costs, particularly since
they may vary dramatically from case to case.
There again is a possible middle ground. Prosecutors should
consider the practical costs. But when new information calls into
question the fairness of a prior proceeding, they should not accord the
conviction any presumption of accuracy. Based on the evidence as they
currently see it, they should exercise discretion by weighing the costs
of a new trial against the likelihood that defendant will deservedly
win an acquittal (according to some standard of belief). On the other
hand, when the new information simply goes to the weight of the
evidence in the prior proceedings, a bright-line rule makes sense
because fairness considerations disappear; defendant's claim,
essentially, is to a second, improved bite at the apple.
What, then, about an option at the other extreme? If new
information gives a prosecutor serious doubts about a defendant's
guilt, she arguably has a greater obligation to help the defendant than
153. It can, for example, be difficult to retry a defendant when witnesses have died or
disappeared, memories have failed, or evidence has degraded or been lost.
154. The costs include not only the expense of retrying the defendant and the diversion of
resources from other live cases, but also the loss of public respect for a system that must admit
wrongdoing.
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she would have had before trial. The basis for this approach is that,
postconviction, the prosecutor cannot rely on a subsequent fair trial to
resolve any qualms that she may have about the defendant's guilt. In
effect, the buck stops with the prosecutor, because she is the final
decisionmaker.
There is a strong argument supporting this approach in
circumstances in which prosecutorial action would simply enable the
defendant to ask another decisionmaker (e.g., a court) to act. 155 Under
this scenario, the prosecutor would be playing the same role as she
plays before trial; namely, allowing the main decisionmaker to hear
the case, after screening the matter only to a limited extent.
The symmetry of this position is appealing. As a practical
matter, however, it probably overemphasizes society's willingness to
allow convicted defendants opportunities for reprieve. Society may be
prepared to absorb the costs of according full adversarial process to
even guilty persons who have not been convicted, but be less willing to
recognize the benefits of process after-the fact. If that is the case, a
more context-based standard of sympathy towards convicted
defendants is more fitting.
2. Problem two: applying the presumption of guilt
Some of the conflicting arguments that have been identified
arise because of the variety of new information that prosecutors can
receive. Any fixed standard for the presumption of guilt will have
difficulty differentiating between a prosecutor who believes that a
defendant is, or may be innocent, and one who simply acknowledges
for the first time that a defendant may have been wrongfully convicted
under the prevailing system of law (even if perhaps guilty). 156 Even if
one can identify an appropriate standard for the presumption,
prosecutors still must decide how much weight to give
the
1 57
presumption.
These issues become especially complex when the prosecutor
finds herself weighing not only the practical costs of revisiting the
conviction against the potential benefits to defendant, but also the
societal benefits of taking postconviction action. Suppose, for example,
155. Prosecutorial action might consist of giving the defendant the new information or
something more-for example, joining the defendant in a motion for a new trial.
156. See John Wilkins, Dumanis Supports New Trial for Convict, SAN DIEGO TRIBUNE, Aug.
5, 2004, at 1 (reporting a newly elected prosecutor's decision to reverse her office's previous
decision to oppose a motion for a new trial for a person convicted twenty-one years earlier).
157. When the issue is something other than whether defendant committed the crime, it
becomes even harder for the prosecutor to implement the presumption.
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that a prosecutor learns of systematic police or prosecutorial
corruption that may have been at play in the defendant's original case.
If the prosecutor remains convinced (based on the remaining valid
evidence) that defendant is guilty, a simple weighing of defendant's
interests versus the societal costs of a new trial might militate in favor
of avoiding action. Yet the prosecutor may recognize societal benefits,
both in exposing the corruption and in demonstrating to the public
that actors in the criminal justice system can recognize and rectify
mistakes in the system. As with many other prosecutorial decisions,
the prosecutor's obligations to multiple constituencies and multiple
interests make strict and clear standards for conduct hard to
identify. 158
3. Problem three: the relevance of the presumption of guilt
a. Postconviction sentencing issues
A wholly different problem arises when the new information
does not affect the prosecutor's view of defendant's guilt or the validity
of the conviction, but suggests that the sentence was too harsh. This
may occur, for example, when the prosecutor learns that others shared
the defendant's responsibility, that the defendant was a culpable but
lesser actor in the crime, that the injury to the victim was less severe
than previously believed, or that the sentencing authority was biased
or corrupt. Alternatively, the change in perspective may be occasioned
by a non-retroactive change in the law that reflects society's view that
the offense is less blameworthy than society thought at the time of its
commission. The presumption of guilt alone does not resolve the
questions of whether the defendant's treatment is fair and whether
the prosecutor should become involved.
The resolution of these issues probably depends, in part, on
whether the local jurisdiction's substantive law provides mechanisms
for amending a defendant's sentence without disturbing the whole
conviction. If, for example, a defendant or prosecutor can move a court
for resentencing at any time based on new evidence, there is little
reason for a prosecutor to view her obligations in resentencing
differently than her obligations during the original sentencing
158. See, e.g., CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.1, at 759-60 (1986)

(discussing prosecutors' constituents); Carol A. Corrigan, On ProsecutorialEthics, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 537, 538-39 (1986) (identifying various constituencies of prosecutors); Zacharias,
Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice,supra note 4, at 57 (same).
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process. 159 She may wish to adopt some presumption against
reconsidering her position in order to ensure some finality and to
avoid constant requests by defendants for her assistance. On the
merits, however, little justification exists for refusing to consider
whether her position regarding defendant's sentence should change.
When no resentencing mechanism is available but an
alternative mechanism exists that can provide some relief (e.g., parole
or sentence commutation), the prosecutor must take into consideration
160
not only the merits, but also her role in the postconviction process.
The prosecutor's view of defendant's likely guilt hardly seems
dispositive of the issues, for a decision to withhold the new
information may prevent the subsequent decisionmaker from reaching
its own decision based on full facts. The scenario here seems closer to
Brady situations, in which prosecutors must assess their own
obligations to disclose in order to enable the anticipated legal process
to work, than to the previously-discussed situation in which the
prosecutor must decide whether to undo a completed conviction
process.
The thorniest scenario, however, is the one in which no
meaningful sentence amelioration process exists-for example, when
defendant has been sentenced to a mandatory sentence that cannot be
amended, and pardons or commutations simply are unattainable.
Here, the prosecutor's only recourse may be to seek to undo the
previous process, in the hope that defendant will be reconvicted but
sentenced more suitably. The prosecutor's obligations to a variety of
constituencies come into stark conflict: fairness to defendant seems to
require a change in the status quo, criminal justice and the rights of
the victim demand at least that the conviction be maintained, and the
state's resource constraints militate against seeking a new trial. A
plea arrangement might accommodate the countervailing concerns,
but no guarantees exist that a plea bargain will be fulfilled. 161 The
presumption of guilt does not help resolve the issues; one can assume
for a fact that defendant is guilty without obviating the prosecutor's
dilemma.
159. As discussed earlier, most jurisdictions impose strict time limits on resentencing.
However, exceptions exist. See supra note 56.
160. This factor will be discussed infra Part III.C.
161. In other words, the prosecutor may negotiate a plea package under which she agrees to
support a motion to vacate the judgment and defendant agrees to plead guilty once the case is
reopened, but there are no guarantees that defendant will stick to his part of the agreement once
the original judgment is vacated. There is no way for the prosecutor to seek reinstatement of the
judgment once defendant declines to plead guilty. Cf. Czajka v. Breedlove, 613 N.Y.S.2d 741, 743
(N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (holding prosecutor to be without authority to enforce defendant's promise
to resign from the police force after the dismissal of criminal charges against him).
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b. Postconvictionjustice issues having nothing to do with guilt or
innocence
The sentencing scenario highlights a series of additional
questions that cannot be answered simply by identifying, or pointing
to, a presumption of guilt. How should prosecutors take into account
the presumption in dealing with issues unrelated to innocence-for
example, where law or equities have changed the situation enough to
give defendant a claim to some relief? Moreover, even when the
defendant's guilt or innocence is directly pertinent, how should
prosecutors take into account practical concerns that have nothing to
do with the theoretical question of whether defendant's conviction
was, and remains, proper? Most importantly, the passage of time may
have practical ramifications for the ability of the prosecutor (and the
defendant) to reproduce evidence and witnesses for any retrial: the
defendant may not be as dangerous as he once was, or may have
become more dangerous as a result of his incarceration; the victims'
outlook may have changed over time, or they may no longer even be
present; society's view of the crime also may have changed. How
should the prosecutor weigh these factors, none of which bear on the
defendant's actual culpability?
As hard as it may be for prosecutors to identify a workable
standard for accommodating new information and finality when they
have reason to question a conviction, it is even more difficult to frame
a fixed standard to accommodate unrelated concerns. Encouraging
prosecutors to note the difficulty and to distinguish among their
reasons for action or inaction hardly advances the ball. The following
Section, therefore, identifies another series of considerations relating
to prosecutors' role in resolving postconviction issues that may assist
prosecutors in resolving some of their dilemmas.
C. The Significance of the Prosecutors'Role
In representing multiple constituencies, 162 prosecutors are
more likely to confront conflicts of interest than are lawyers who
represent single clients. Prosecutors typically understand the
potential conflicts at the trial stage because they face them all the
time. 163 The interests of victims, the community, the defendant, law
162. See Zacharias, Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice, supra note 4, at 57 (discussing
prosecutors' constituencies).
163. For a discussion of what it means for prosecutors to act "neutrally" with respect to their
multiple constituencies, see generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 837, 860-64 (2004).
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enforcement agencies, and the judicial system frequently contradict
each other. At the postconviction stage, in contrast, prosecutors may
not recognize the conflicts as readily because the various
constituencies ordinarily are less active, may be unrepresented, and
may not even know that an issue exists. As a procedural matter, this
means that the judgment of prosecutors often will be clouded without
their recognizing the possibility of a conflict of interest. This, in turn,
may lead them to rely too much on the presumption of guilt as a
means for justifying inaction.
1. The range of conflicts of interest
Postconviction justice issues can raise several types of conflicts
that are different in nature than standard trial-level conflicts among
multiple constituencies. First, when new information calls a previous
conviction into question, a prosecutor's personal interests are often
implicated. 164 If the prosecutor was involved in the prior trial, she has
an interest in protecting her track record and reputation. 165 Even if
she was not involved, questioning the prior conviction may damage
her relationship with a colleague (or former colleague) who was
involved or friends of that colleague, particularly when new
information reflects prior prosecutorial misconduct. 16 6 She must also
protect her relationship with her supervisors, who may have an
interest in avoiding adverse public reaction if the new information is
revealed; postconviction issues tend to be highly publicized and can
16 7
affect a district attorney's hopes for reelection.
Second, the interests in achieving "justice" may conflict with
the interest of the prosecutor's office more generally. 168 Bringing to
164. Some of these interests are discussed in Goldberg & Siegel, supra note 24, at 409-10. In
the end, Goldberg and Siegel assume the conclusion that prosecutors must give primary weight
to three so-called "obligations" in addressing a defendant's request for the application of new
scientific testing to evidence: "to promptly seek [the] fullest possible accounting of the truth," "to
effect full disclosure in completed cases," and "to utilize [the] most accurate scientific methods."
Id. at 410-12. Goldberg and Siegel do not make clear, however, why those factors should
outweigh all others, even in the innocence scenarios that they discuss.
165. See Medved, supra note 65, at 134-48 (discussing psychological barriers preventing
prosecutors from revisiting convictions).
166. See generally Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: Is it Time to Take Prosecution
Discipline Seriously? 8 UDC L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (reviewing empirical evidence and
concluding that prosecutorial misconduct contributes to a large percentage of cases in which
defendants are mistakenly convicted).
167. See id. at 151-59 (discussing political considerations for prosecutors who concede that a
previous conviction was erroneous).
168. See id. at 136, 145 (discussing prosecutors' fear in cases involving DNA evidence that
"postconviction exoneration of an innocent prisoner [might undermine] the credibility of the
office" and interfere with obtaining cooperation of law enforcement agencies).
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light flaws in a previous conviction can damage the reputation of the
office, especially in instances involving misconduct. Public trust and
cooperation may be affected. To the extent a prosecutor acts on
information revealing misconduct by law enforcement officers, their
the
reaction and those of their colleagues also may interfere with
69
prosecutor's ability to accomplish her functions in future cases.'
Third, a more theoretical set of potential conflicts arises with
respect to the interests of the state. On the one hand, the state should
wish to incarcerate, or keep incarcerated, only persons who have been
properly convicted and deserve their status. On the other hand, the
prosecutor may perceive a risk to the state of being sued by the
defendant if the prosecutor discloses that misconduct or some other
avoidable error resulted in the conviction. 170 Particularly when a
prosecutor still has some belief in the defendant's guilt, the ancillary
costs to the state of undoing the conviction may militate in favor of
avoiding action.
A prosecutor also may perceive a state interest in avoiding
having other convictions called into question. Suppose, for example,
that a prosecutor discovers a problem with the state's evidencegathering technique that may have resulted in a conviction of a
defendant now provably innocent through new technology. Suppose
further that the same evidence-gathering mechanism was used in all
the state's prosecutions, including those of many defendants likely to
be guilty. To the extent that revealing the error to free the first
defendant may open the door to challenges against all convictions
occurring during the period, the prosecutor is freighted with the
state's conflicting interests.
2. Responding to conflicts of interests
On the one hand, noting these postconviction conflicts of
interest may simply suggest that prosecutors should be cognizant of
the conflicts in their decisionmaking process. Alternatively, it may
suggest a bigger problem about the prosecutor's role that requires the
prosecutor to determine whether she or a different actor in the justice
system should decide a particular postconviction issue. On this view,
the prosecutor would have to analyze a series of considerations.
169. Prosecutors, of course, depend on the goodwill of other law enforcement officials to
conduct investigations and manage their cases.
170. This dilemma can arise at the trial stage as well, when a prosecutor learns of police or
other official misconduct that might justify dismissal of a case, but that also might be the basis
for a lawsuit against the municipality. A few cases have addressed this issue and courts, for the
most part, have found any tying of the resolution of the criminal and civil cases to be distasteful.
See supra text accompanying note 134.
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Initially, prosecutors need to ask themselves how much the
legal system depends on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in this
context. At the trial stage, for example, the legal system arguably
relies on prosecutors to seek justice independently of defense counsel
171
and the courts mainly when the adversarial playing field is tilted.
In other circumstances, the system anticipates that the adversarial
process will best produce suitable results when the prosecutor adopts
172
a fully partisan role.
Postconviction issues may arise, in whole or in part, in the
context of an adversarial process. When a defendant brings a motion
for a new trial, for example, a prosecutor might reasonably assume
that the "justice" of defendant's position will best be determined by a
clash between partisan efforts on the part of defense counsel and
herself. On the other hand, when the prosecutor comes into unique
possession of information that might provide the basis for a motion,
but defendant has no access to that information,1 73 there is no process
that can substitute for action on the prosecutor's part.
Likewise, a prosecutor may need to consider whether
alternative mechanisms exist for producing the "justice" in question.
For example, when defendant has an equitable claim to a change in
his circumstance, as in the situation when the law has reduced the
penalties for his crime nonretroactively, parole and pardon
proceedings may be more fitting vehicles to accomplish a remedy than
prosecutorial revisitation of the conviction. In contrast, in some
situations, prosecutors seem to be vested with largely exclusive
discretion to seek fair results, as in the administration of real
1 74
promises that courts refuse to enforce.
The availability of alternative decisionmakers who can produce
the same postconviction justice as the prosecutor requires the
prosecutor to consider who is best suited to judge the issues in light of
the potential conflicts of interest, knowledge, and familiarity with the
task. In the situation involving new exculpatory evidence, for example,
courts may be better suited to judging the value of the evidence-in
which case it may make more sense for the prosecutor to allow the
defendant to present the matter to a judge rather than simply to
171. See Zacharias, Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice, supra note 4, at 60 (suggesting
that the professional codes' requirement that prosecutors do justice at trial "must focus on cases
in which the [adversarial] system itself is defective").
172. See id. at 60 ("[When the adversary system operates in its intended fashion,
competition by definition produces appropriate results.").
173. This situation may arise, for example, when a prosecutor obtains information regarding
the bribery of witnesses or police officers.
174. See supra text accompanying note 112.
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decide whether to bring a motion to dismiss on her own. In the context
of new laws, the prosecutor may need to determine whether the
legislature actually considered the issue of retroactivity. If so, the
legislature may be the better policymaker. And where the issue is
purely one of "mercy," the availability of a pardon authority and its
willingness to exercise its authority in pertinent cases may
appropriately lead a prosecutor to conclude that she is not the most
suitable decisionmaker.
There are a variety of reasons for which prosecutors might
reasonably deem it proper to defer to alternative decisionmakers even
when the claim to prosecutorial decisionmaking seems relatively
strong. First, prosecutors must consider the danger that their own
judgment will be particularly clouded because of their conflicts of
interest. Second, the alternative decisionmaker may have been
assigned the particular role of making such decisions and have more
experience and competence at it.1 75 Prosecutors who learn information
that might cause one of these alternative decisionmakers to act
favorably to defendants arguably should defer to them-by making
sure they receive the information-but should not prejudge their
decisions by acting in their place (e.g., by moving for dismissal or a
sentence reduction or by deciding not to take action and withholding
the information from the defendant and the alternative
decisionmakers).
Prosecutors thus may have to resolve the postconviction issues
at several levels. They need to identify alternative decisionmaking
mechanisms and decisionmakers. They need to assess their own roles
and competence as well as the roles and competence of the alternative
decisionmakers. And, not to be forgotten, they need to determine
whether prosecutorial action is necessary simply to encourage the
alternative decisionmakers to address the issues or to enable them to
decide in an evenhanded fashion.
These questions can become especially important when a
prosecutor is considering whether justice requires her to act not on a
defendant's behalf, but for victims and third parties affected by the
defendant's conviction.176 In one sense, prosecutors may be the persons
most familiar with the plight of victims and affected third parties and
may have developed a close relationship with them through the trial
process. Arguably, however, when other governmental actors are
involved in assuring a just result for the victims and third persons, a
175. Parole and pardon authorities, for example, specialize in considering the equities of
continued incarceration, while legislatures are charged with making the policy decisions
regarding which crimes deserve particular penalties.
176. See supra text accompanying note 33.
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prosecutor's responsibility to help victims and third persons decreases.
The presence of a social service agency charged with finding a home
for a child made parentless by a defendant's incarceration, 177 for
example, may supplant the prosecutor's need to accept personal
responsibility. 178 Likewise, the availability of victims' advocates may
obviate the imperative for a prosecutor to help a victim obtain
restitution or compensation. When, in contrast, a victim is not aware
of the existence of compensation mechanisms, the prosecutor may be
in the sole position to guide the victim. Moreover, when the resources
of advocacy agencies are so stretched that they do not adequately
serve their constituents, the prosecutor must recall that the victims
are part of her constituency as well. She thus may need to supplement
the activities of the alternative actors, at least to the extent of
directing the victims to resources for obtaining assistance.
3. Prosecutors' role in ancillary proceedings
In addition to considering the availability of alternative
mechanisms and decisionmakers who are wholly or partly responsible
for implementing postconviction justice, prosecutors also must
consider the relationship between prosecutions and parallel
proceedings, including civil litigation against defendants. This Article
already has noted situations in which third parties may call upon
prosecutors for assistance in these parallel proceedings: for example,
testimony supporting a restraining or custody order in a case
involving an abusive defendant or cooperation in a damage action filed
by a defendant's victim.
Ordinarily, prosecutors conceptualize civil proceedings as being
independent of prosecutorial activities. But that can be a
rationalization. Some proceedings truly are designed to complement,
not simply parallel, a prosecution. They may be dependent upon the
result of the prosecution and may rely on information in the sole
possession of law enforcement authorities.
Perhaps the clearest examples of interdependent matters are
civil commitment proceedings for mentally ill defendants and habitual
sex offenders. These are designed to incapacitate, in much the same
way as criminal prosecutions and based upon the same evidence. The
177. This scenario might arise, for example, in the case of a single mother who is convicted of
child abuse.
178. However, the criminal ramifications for a parent of cooperating with the social service
agency or family court sometimes prevents the parent from acting in the child's best interests.
Prosecutors can help alleviate the parent's dilemma, for example, by authorizing use immunity
for statements the parent might make in connection with the custody proceedings.
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quandary for the prosecutor is whether the criminal law sets the
boundaries for her participation (and the sanctions that she should
seek against a defendant) or whether her role includes taking further
action to protect society or benefit the victims or affected third parties.
There is no easy calculus here, but the prosecutor clearly has to
distinguish among parallel, complementary, and supplemental
proceedings. Some authorizing statutes, such as the civil commitment
for sex offender laws, envision prosecutorial participation. The more
that the alternative proceedings depend on prosecutorial participation,
the more likely it is that society wishes prosecutors to perceive
participation as part of their role.
Other civil litigation, however, may be either parallel or
complementary in nature. Society probably does not want prosecutors
to become involved routinely in lawsuits against defendants. That
would consume the prosecutors' time and resources, detract from their
objectivity in the criminal proceedings, and risk prosecutorial
vendettas. 179 On the other hand, to the extent that the prosecutors'
functions are designed, at least in part, to incapacitate defendants and
protect their victims, restraining orders and the like can be a natural
complement to prosecutorial decisions in the underlying criminal
18 0
case.
4. Responding to issues of "role"
The series of dilemmas described above suggests that the
problem of the prosecutor's role is more deep-seated than a simple
question of balancing countervailing factors. Personal conflicts
hamstring individual decisionmaking. In expecting prosecutors to
decide the issues on a case-by-case basis, society often is asking them
to resolve broad policy questions (e.g., how complementary
proceedings should interrelate) that they may have no capacity to
resolve on any principled basis. A reasonable argument therefore can
be made that some or all of these decisions should be taken out of the
hands of individual prosecutors through the appointment of a neutral
decisionmaker (e.g., an ombudsman or independent prosecutor),18 1
179. These, presumably, are some of the justifications for ethics rules that forbid part-time
and former prosecutors to participate in civil matters related to cases they have handled as
prosecutors. See supratext accompanying note 93.
180. Thus, for example, the decision to offer diversion to an abusive spouse or parent might
be dependent on the existence of a restraining order issued against that spouse in a separate
civil proceeding.
181. Cf. H. Richard Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor: The Obligation of Dispassion in a
PassionatePursuit, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1695, 1714-16 (2000) (arguing in favor of separating
some of the adjudicative and advocacy functions of prosecutors).
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development of an internal administrative mechanism for resolving
the issues, or a legislative determination of prosecutors' role in
alternative processes.
D. Specific Issues
The previous Sections have discussed broad categories of issues
that affect the calculus of how to render postconviction justice. This
Section considers a series of largely unrelated considerations, or
questions, that prosecutors may also need to contemplate.
1. The nature of the prosecutorial decision to be made
This Article's earlier analysis of the presumption of guilt
illustrated that the emphasis to be given particular factors in
individual cases is subject to debate. It is worth considering how much
prosecutors should take the absence of consensus into account. One
might, for example, rely upon the presumption of guilt to establish a
rule that prosecutors should question a conviction only when
prosecutors universally, or almost universally, would agree that
questioning the conviction makes sense. Allowing prosecutors to vary
significantly in their approaches reflects potentially unprincipled
policymaking. Because frequent correction of prior convictions may
have an adverse (though perhaps deserved) effect on public respect for
the justice system, prosecutors should hesitate to follow a
standardless course.
For similar reasons, prosecutors probably need to consider
whether solutions to particular dilemmas ought to be implemented on
a systematic rather than case-by-case basis. For example, to the
extent new technology becomes available to verify (or disprove) prior
convictions, the question of when this technology should be used will
apply to many cases. The correct resolution probably depends on a
variety of factors, including expense of the technology, who is to bear
the expense, the effect on evidence- gathering resources in other
cases, 8 2 and the likelihood that injustices will be exposed. Allowing
the balancing to be conducted on an ad hoc basis typically would favor
represented defendants who can afford to raise the issues and offer to
bear some of the expense. Prosecutors and their offices therefore
182. For example, to the extent that a police forensic laboratory is the key unit that performs
DNA testing in a particular jurisdiction, its ability to perform the tests in current cases may be
undermined by the need to perform tests (or even to provide the samples) in a large number of
closed cases.
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should consider whether decisionmaking through a general rule would
18 3
lead to fairer and more evenhanded results.
2. The issue of fault
This Article has not yet focused on the relevance, or
irrelevance, of the degree to which prosecutors participated in causing
the problem that potentially needs correction. Arguably, for example,
discovery of corruption in the prosecutor's office during the earlier
trial process creates an imperative for subsequent prosecutorial action
because the corruption suggests that the earlier prosecutor failed to
perform her initial screening functions. The subsequent prosecutor
should be ready to act because the prosecutor's office is in the best
position to evaluate and, if necessary, correct prosecutorial errors. If,
on the other hand, one conceptualizes the issue simply as one of
governmental fault, then misconduct by any branch that may have
affected the outcome is equally blameworthy.
Although fault notions have resonance politically, it is unclear
that they are relevant to the achievement of postconviction
prosecutorial justice. Presumably, the imperative to action is the
possibility, or likelihood, that action is necessary to bring about a
suitable result. The frame of mind of previous governmental actors
seems less important than the consequences their conduct produced.184
On the other hand, to the extent one conceives of the ethical
obligation to do justice as a corollary of due process and fair trial
cases, courts seem to have focused on fault in those contexts.
Prosecutorial "misconduct" typically has played a significant role in
due process decisions; mere neglect has been left to the adversarial
process to resolve.18 5 Imbedded in these cases is an acceptance of the
183. This type of decisionmaking process helps account for the development within
particular prosecutors' offices of programs and policies that respond to the potential availability
of DNA evidence relating to older cases in which identity was in issue. See supra text
accompanying notes 93-100.
184. Cf. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982) (stating that the resolution of cases of
alleged prosecutorial misconduct should turn on "the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of
the prosecutor").
185. See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 381 (1982) (requiring a showing of
actual prosecutorial vindictiveness to establish a due process violation based on prosecutorial
misconduct in charging); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962) (rejecting a postconviction
challenge based on discriminatory prosecution on the reasoning that defendant had failed to
allege that the selective prosecution was "deliberately" based on improper criteria); cf. LAFAVE,
supra note 147, § 13.4(d), at 695 (arguing that prosecutorial intent should have "no application
when a defendant in a criminal prosecution is seeking dismissal of the charges against him
because of the basis upon which he was selected for prosecution").
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reality that society must live with come mistakes that the system
18 6
inevitably will produce.
3. Nonsubstantive considerations
Above, this Article alluded to a number of practical
considerations that prosecutors might consider that have nothing to
do with the merits of a case. Under current regimes, prosecutors must
decide individually the weight, if any, to be given such factors. One
could, however, easily establish societal preferences regarding some of
these practical concerns through legislation, ethics rules, or
administrative guidelines. Other concerns, typically those more
personal in nature, are less susceptible to bright line rules.
a. Public concerns
How, for example, should a prosecutor consider the public costs
of taking action that might undo a conviction or embroil the
prosecutor in separate proceedings unrelated to criminal prosecution?
These costs can take several forms. First, there is the expenditure of
direct and indirect resources. Any significant action by a prosecutor
will consume her time and, if it occasions another proceeding (e.g., a
new trial), other public resources as well. Should the prosecutor ignore
these practical considerations, subject them to the same resource
analysis that she applies to pretrial matters, or rely upon them as
significant factors in favor of deferring prosecutorial action?
Second, how should the prosecutor consider the possibility that
taking action will provoke requests for similar action in other cases,
some inappropriate, that also will consume resources? For example, a
prosecutor's willingness to perform a DNA test with reference to a
previous rape conviction inevitably will cause other defendants to seek
a similar indulgence, particularly if the first result is favorable to the
accused and is publicized. Unless the prosecutor and the prosecutor's
office are prepared to revisit each previous conviction, it needs to
87
establish criteria for when such requests will be honored.
These two types of concerns may simply reflect the complexity
of establishing an appropriate presumption of guilt, given the costs of
surrendering finality in decisionmaking. Legitimate standards can be
186. As a practical matter, in cases involving intentional governmental misconduct, the
outcome usually will be the same whether or not one focuses on fault. Intentional misconduct is
likely to have helped produce a questionable result. The issue of fault looms larger in deciding
what presumption of guilt to emphasize; if prosecutors give greater deference to questionable
convictions obtained honestly, the justice calculus may change dramatically.
187. Some prosecutors' offices have done so. See supra text accompanying note 93.
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set (through rule or internal guidelines) for whether and how
individual prosecutors should consider the concerns, though the
precise substance of any such standard is likely to be debatable.
What, however, of the situations in which achieving a correct
result itself has costs? Correcting a wrongful conviction resulting from
governmental misconduct may, for example, produce a civil lawsuit by
the aggrieved defendant. In the abstract, we would like to be able to
say such an eventuality is irrelevant when justice is at issue. A
legislature would never incorporate it explicitly into a standard of
prosecutorial conduct as a justification for avoiding a just
prosecutorial act. But society might nonetheless want this factor to be
considered. Should an individual prosecutor be able to add the likely
costs of the lawsuit to the balance in deciding whether to proceed?
Alternatively, is the prosecutor justified in extracting a promise not to
sue as part of a bargain, or plea bargain, before agreeing to a
l8 8
dismissal?
Finally, there are the costs associated with the likely public
reaction to the prosecutorial decision. News of governmental
misconduct that resulted systematically in unfair trials can, for
example, seriously damage public trust in the criminal justice system.
This can have immediate effects in terms of public cooperation with
law enforcement authorities, defendants' willingness to make
bargains, and the general willingness of citizens to obey the law.
Conversely, however, prosecutorial agencies must take into equal
account the possibility of adverse public reaction if the information
becomes known and no action is taken. These considerations, again,
cannot be implemented by rule both because they seem irrelevant to
the issue of justice and because they are so hard to measure. Do such
practical realities also signify that prosecutors should not consider
18 9
them on an ad hoc basis?
b. Personal concerns
There are a series of personal concerns that at one level seem
irrelevant to the issue of prosecutorial justice and therefore seem like
factors that we should instruct prosecutors to ignore. On deeper
inspection, however, some of these factors have practical corollaries
that color them with more serious justification.
For example, prosecutors presumably should not defer just
action simply because it would reveal information that embarrasses
188. See supra note 170.
189. Cf. Schaffter, supra note 46, at 721 (noting critically that "[p]rosecutors can be partisan
officials who may not be inclined to grant a request if it may be politically controversial").
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themselves, colleagues or former colleagues in the prosecutor's office,
or other law enforcement personnel. To the extent that taking action
undermines a prosecutor's ability to perform her functions in other
unrelated cases, however, she will be inclined to take such
ramifications into account. Exposing police corruption may prevent
the prosecutor from obtaining cooperation from even unaffected police
officers. Exposing her own errors, or those of her office, may
undermine her credibility in making future legal arguments.
A more frequent personal concern is the likelihood that taking
action will create work for the prosecutor and, if the information
reveals a systematic flaw in previous convictions, will increase the
workload of the whole office. Viscerally, one might again assume that
such resource concerns do not justify avoiding just conduct. However,
if the additional work will undercut the ability of the prosecutor or her
office to achieve just results in other cases because of a lack of
resources, the concern assumes added legitimacy. 190
A related personal concern involves the prosecutorial fear that,
while a new trial might be justified because of a prior taint that does
not necessarily establish innocence, the prosecutor will be unable to
prove her case because of the passage of time. The presumption of
innocence suggests that this should be the state's cross to bear. Yet
there is something less convincing about the emphasis on the
prosecutor's burden of proof when the burden could have been (and
seems to have been) carried at an earlier time and only happenstance
stands in the way currently.
If commentators or rulemakers were to focus on these personal
concerns, they probably would conclude that the concerns do not
justify consideration. Equally probably, however, prosecutors do take
them into account. If society means to reject the arguments supporting
them, that rejection needs to be explicit.
There is one final personal concern that seems more legitimate:
the degree to which action or inaction is consistent with the
prosecutor's conscience. Consider, for example, a situation in which
190. Consider, for example, an episode of the television program "The D.A." in which a
prosecutor agreed to a plea bargain with a corrupt judge. On the one hand, the judge should have
been prosecuted for bribery and as an accessory to murder. Publicizing the judge's conduct,
however, would have encouraged all defendants who had been convicted in the judge's court
during his twenty-one year tenure to challenge their convictions. This, the prosecutor concluded,
would have imposed insurmountable resource burdens on the District Attorney's office, which
would have had to cope with the deluge of new cases without additional resources. The
prosecutor concluded that a plea bargain that resulted in the resignation of the judge and the
correction of the one case in which the prosecutor knew a false conviction had occurred, but
which did not result in public bribery charges, best served the overall interests of justice. The
D.A: The People vs. Sergius Kovinsky (ABC television broadcast, Mar. 19, 2004).
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there is an equitable, but no legal, basis for a defendant's request for
assistance. Perhaps an aged defendant has found God, can show
himself to be totally rehabilitated, and can also show a special need
for his release on the part of his family. Should a merciful prosecutor
be able to follow her conscience and seek the defendant's release, even
though hard-nosed prosecutors would perceive their duty to the law as
requiring them to uphold the previous conviction and sentence? Again,
absent some rule or standard identifying whether and to what extent
prosecutors may take purely equitable considerations into account, the
nature of postconviction justice will be ad hoc. Yet the difficulty of
cataloguing all situations in which equitable claims can arise
mitigates in favor of recognizing a measure of prosecutorial discretion.
4. Temporal and relational considerations
Serious temporal concerns can affect a prosecutor's willingness
to reopen a case. The passage of time inevitably affects her ability, and
that of the defendant, to gather evidence. Witnesses may die,
disappear, or forget. Juries become dubious about witness recall, even
when that recall is strong. Victims may become reluctant to cooperate.
The passage of time may influence prosecutors to side with
victims and third parties, and against defendants, in other ways as
well. First, to the extent the deficiency in the earlier proceeding was
caused in part by an error in the prosecutor's office, the prosecutor
may feel guilty about having to put victims and third parties through
another ordeal. Similarly, the earlier prosecution process may have
produced a relationship between the prosecutor and the victim or
affected third parties that might affect the neutrality of her
judgment. 191 Third, particularly when the prosecutor believes the
defendant is properly incarcerated (for this or some other crime 19 2),
victim's rights may seem to be the only active consideration that is
193
significant as a practical matter.
These are largely psychological considerations that probably do
affect prosecutors. Rules are unlikely to preempt prosecutors' reliance
191. For a discussion of the meaning of prosecutorial neutrality, see generally Green &
Zacharias, supra note 163.
192. Consider, for example, the case of a serial rapist who has been prosecuted only with
respect to one rape in order to avoid putting additional victims through the ordeal of a trial. In
deciding whether to take steps that might undermine the single conviction, may the prosecutor
take into account the interests of all the rape victims?
193. See, e.g., David Meier, The Prosecution'sPerspective on Postconviction Relief in Light of
DNA Technology and Newly Discovered Evidence, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 657, 660 (2001)
(describing the psychological difficulty of one prosecutor when confronted by the need to inform
victims that postconviction relief is appropriate).
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on them, even if society wished to adopt such rules. The existence of
these factors may, however, militate in favor of implementing
procedures that can relieve those prosecutors who are burdened with
psychological influences of decisionmaking responsibility.
V. POSSIBLE REGULATORY RESPONSES TO POSTCONVICTION JUSTICE

ISSUES
This Article has noted a plethora of considerations relevant to
the obligation of prosecutors to serve postconviction justice. The
considerations tend to be case-sensitive, often cut in opposite
directions, and are susceptible to inconsistent assessments by
prosecutors with differing perspectives. The following sections briefly
analyze how professional code drafters might respond to these
considerations and then address how other regulators might take
them into account, perhaps in conjunction with new code provisions.
A. Justice Under the Ethics Codes
One option is for ethics codes to adopt an artificial framework
that resolves some or all of the issues. Professional rulemakers could,
for example, start with prosecutorial obligations at the trial stage and
ratchet down the requirement of taking action one level because of the
presumption of guilt and the costs of reconsidering a case as if it were
just beginning. Thus, if a prosecutor's trial obligation would be to
dismiss an indictment, the postconviction obligation might simply be
to disclose the problem to the defendant or the court; a trial obligation
of voluntary disclosure would be reduced to a postconviction obligation
of disclosure only when disclosure is requested by the defendant; and
a duty to answer a request would become no duty to act at all.
The problem with this approach is that the required
prosecutorial responses do not necessarily fit the issues. The
justification for prosecutorial action in the trial context may not apply
postconviction because the same due process concerns may not be
evident. Conversely, reducing the level of action may not be justified
by temporal problems or the likelihood of the defendant's guilt.
Perhaps most importantly, the solutions simply may be unrealistic
given the scenarios identified in this Article.
A second option is for the codes to focus more directly on the
effects of the passage of time. In other words, the rulemakers could
require prosecutors to consider what their obligations would have
been had the same situation arisen within the adversarial trial

2005]

SERVING JUSTICE AFTER CONVICTIONS

231

process and then to consider explicitly whether and why their
obligations should be different in the situation they now confront.
The appeal of this approach disappears when one considers
hard cases. The postconviction setting almost always will differ
significantly from the adversarial setting. There are often no
alternative decisionmakers. Defendants typically have no access to the
pertinent information and cannot protect their own interests. Because
the postconviction setting is likely to diverge from an adversarial
context, prosecutors will find themselves without guidance in
differentiating their postconviction and trial obligations.
The difficulty for code drafters is the one with which we began.
There is no easily identifiable, universal touchstone for defining a
rule. At one level, it looks as if the drafters can do no more than offer
their collective personal opinions regarding how prosecutors should
react to particular situations-opinions that may be no more
justifiable than those of prosecutors who disagree with the
rulemakers' values.
Perhaps more is possible, however. By cataloguing the relevant
considerations, this Article has focused the issues sufficiently for code
drafters to begin addressing the issues. Some of the categories the
Article has discussed do lend themselves to policymaking by rule or
standard. The following subsections outline a few possible approaches.
The resulting debate should, at a minimum, identify norms acceptable
to the bar and help reduce consideration of prosecutorial dilemmas to
a more manageable set of issues.
1. Substantive guidelines relating to the presumption of guilt
It would be appropriate for code drafters to select a standard
for the presumption of guilt that prosecutors could apply uniformly. As
in the pre-trial context, any choice is debatable. Adoption of a
standard, however, at least requires an actual debate, which in turn
has two beneficial effects: it is likely to lead to a justifiable norm; and,
it identifies the competing theoretical considerations in a way that
provides individual prosecutors with some illumination. In any event,
the identification of a single standard will promote more consistent
behavior.
As noted above, there are three generic types of presumptions
that code drafters might adopt: (1) a backward-looking assessment of
the level of belief the prosecutor currently has regarding the
defendant's guilt; (2) a current assessment of the prosecutor's belief
that the defendant is innocent; or (3) a split assessment of the
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likelihood of defendant's guilt/innocence and the fairness of the
process defendant received at trial.
Whatever presumption code drafters adopt, however, it is
important for them to highlight that the presumption should be
applied directly only to certain types of cases; most notably, those in
which the defendant now has a claim to dismissal of the case. Where a
defendant has a different kind of equitable claim, the drafters should
take an express position on how the prosecutor's level of belief is
relevant to her obligations. It is important for the drafters to make
clear that prosecutorial obligations to accomplish justice do not end
with questions of defendants' rights, but may also extend to achieving
results that benefit victims and third parties.
2. Substantive guidelines relating to exculpatory information
In the pretrial context, ethics codes have adopted standards
regarding prosecutorial disclosure of evidence that materially benefits
the defense. 194 Some of these simply incorporate legal obligations
while others go beyond legal requirements. There is no reason why
similar standards should not develop for the postconviction setting,
identifying when disclosure is required and what kinds of material
must be disclosed. 195 Again, any resolution may be debatable, but a
consistent standard of any form has the benefit of avoiding ad hoc
decisionmaking by individual prosecutors who have incentives to
196
avoid disclosure.
194. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.8 ("The prosecutor in a criminal case

shall... (d) make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense").
195. Cf. Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors,67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441,
3466 (1999) (criticizing the Model Rules of Professional Conduct for remaining "silent about a
prosecutor's post-trial obligations to re-open cases when she becomes aware of uncontroverted
evidence that the person convicted is innocent"); Ryan E. Mick, The Federal Prosecutors Ethics
Act: Solution or Revolution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1251, 1284-85 (2001) (criticizing state ethics codes
for failing to address prosecutors' postconviction obligations when they discover new evidence).
196. Bruce Green has suggested that judicial committees, rather than private code-drafting
groups, would be better suited for developing such rules, Bruce A. Green, ProsecutorialEthics as
Usual, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1573, 1573-80. This Article takes no position on who should draft
standards. To the extent, however, that the objection to specific professional rules governing
prosecutors rests on the rules' potential inconsistency with judicial standards, it is important to
recognize that the scenarios addressed here, for the most part, have not been-and potentially
might never be-addressed by the courts.
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3. Substantive guidelines relating to the legitimacy of practical
considerations
Previously, this Article noted a series of "nonsubstantive"
concerns that might bear on individual prosecutorial decisionmaking,
including public, private, and temporal concerns that on the surface
seem irrelevant to just decisionmaking, but on closer examination
seem more justifiable. 197 Because prosecutors inevitably will take
these considerations into account, it behooves code drafters to address
their legitimacy directly.
If society wishes to classify some of them as illegitimate, only
an express statement to that effect will influence prosecutors (and
then only some prosecutors) to disregard them. Such statements also
will ease the task of prosecutors in justifying their decisions to
disregard the inappropriate considerations to colleagues and other law
enforcement personnel. 198 Conversely, to the extent society wishes
prosecutors to rely on the questionable considerations, that issue
should be debated and resolved by an express standard, rather than
remaining hidden and being addressed on an individual discretionary
basis.
4. Substantive guidelines relating to specific issues and particular
types of cases
Code drafters routinely must decide the level of specificity at
which to address categories of ethical behavior. General rules, such as
the prescription that prosecutors simply "do justice" have the benefit
of covering a wide range of situations and providing a hortatory
standard, but also tend to provide minimal guidance. 199 In contrast,
providing solutions to specific, fact-sensitive dilemma situations
controls misbehavior, but excessive specificity in regulation can
mislead lawyers into believing the regulation provides answers for all
situations. Being too specific in the ethics codes thus may undermine
197. See supra text accompanying notes 185-194.
198. One of the functions of professional codes is to provide guidance in a clear way that
enables the target lawyers to point to the codes in explaining, and justifying, their conduct to
others. See Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalismand Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1303, 1359-1360, 1370 (1995) (discussing the use of codes in discussing potential ethical
issues with clients).
199. See Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in ProfessionalResponsibility Codes: Theory, Practice,
and the Paradigmof ProsecutorialEthics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 259-60 (1993) (analyzing
the relationship between specificity and "role-setting").
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prosecutors' readiness to engage in introspection regarding the
200
suitability of conduct in a wide range of cases.
Because of the high level of generality in the current regime
governing prosecutorial obligations, there is little risk that future
changes will become so detailed as to overregulate. There thus is room
for code drafters to take positions regarding some of the particular
issues illustrated in this Article, particularly issues that prosecutors
might overlook in the absence of additional guidance. Prime
candidates are situations involving postconviction obligations to
victims and third parties, which prosecutors otherwise might not
perceive as fitting within their functions.
B. Potential Changes Requiring Joint Action by Code Drafters,
Legislators, and Other Regulators
The postconviction justice issues that this Article has
highlighted cannot all be resolved through ethics rulemaking. Indeed,
in some areas, it is wholly inappropriate for bar associations
(populated more heavily by defense attorneys than prosecutors) to
attempt to control prosecutorial behavior. 20 1 In other areas,
professional standards that identify the conflicts of interest
prosecutors face and the risks inherent in prosecutors undertaking
inconsistent roles can prompt the development of supplementary
legislative or administrative solutions.
1. Providing procedural fairness
There are procedural mechanisms that might minimize the
conflicts of interest that prosecutors confront at the postconviction
stage. To the extent that the conflicts arise from a prosecutor's
personal conflicts-for example, the interest in avoiding exposure of
impropriety in a case the prosecutor herself handled-the standard
200. Id. at 262 ("A highly specific professional requirement... risks stultifying lawyers'
independent evaluation of appropriate responses"); see also Fred C. Zacharias, Limits on Client
Autonomy in Legal Ethics Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 199, 230-31 (2001) (discussing specific code
provisions that, by being specific, risk leading lawyers to engage in inappropriate conduct
unthinkingly).
201. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors
Or, Who Should Regulate the Regulators?, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 429, 449 (1996) (arguing, in the
context of no-contacts regulation, that the ABA and Department of Justice each "consists largely
of one side in the regulated litigation, so each is likely to allow institutional or membership
interests to dominate its substantive value choices"); Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules
Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 954 (1992) (noting the
possible "hidden agenda" of bar regulators seeking to impose limits on prosecutorial subpoenas of
attorneys).
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solution of recusal can suffice. This solution is best implemented by a
rule identifying grounds for recusal and a supportive internal office
mechanism for shifting cases.
Many of the role problems this Article has identified are more
generic, however. The potential conflicts may involve (1) the conflict
between the interests of the office and defendants' rights, (2)
interoffice and interagency politics, or (3) an analysis of independent
state interests in avoiding exposure of error or previous governmental
misconduct. The dangers lie not so much in the prosecutor's individual
biases, but rather in the lack of standards by which she can choose
among countervailing interests.
It may be impossible to create ethics rules that determine each
of the potential problem situations, but internal mechanisms for
standardizing decisionmaking and eliminating over-reliance on
prosecutorial discretion probably can be established. Prosecutorial
agencies might create review boards or peer review procedures to
assist individual decisionmaking once a prosecutor identifies a
postconviction justice issue. Prosecutors are less likely to avoid such
review than in cases involving personal conflicts because they are
likely to welcome assistance in resolving the dilemmas they face. In
the long term, the existence of procedures also can help develop
standards that will guide future decisionmaking.
Professional rulemakers can play a role in prompting the
development of internal procedures. Initially, the codes can (and to
some extent already do) encompass conflict of interest rules that alert
prosecutors generally to situations in which they confront multiple,
potentially inconsistent responsibilities. The codes, however, can do a
better job of identifying specific conflict standards unique to
prosecutors based, perhaps, on the conflict scenarios this Article has
identified. The codes' traditional methodology of basing conflict-ofinterest rules on the actions of clients and their potentially conflicting
concerns has less value for prosecutors who serve a single client (i.e.,
the state) which itself represents an amalgam of interests.
The codes could go further. In recent years, the commentary
and even some codes have emphasized rules that impose supervisory
responsibility on legal organizations and their managers. 202 Numerous
202. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a), (c)(2) (imposing responsibility on

a law firm manager to institute measures to ensure professional responsibility and to prevent
professional misconduct of which he is aware); accord N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1(a),
5.3(a); see also N.Y. CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 1-102(A), 5-105(e) (specifically imposing

requirements on a "lawyer or law firm").
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scholars have proposed entity liability for ethics decisionmaking. 203 In
this vein, code drafters might usefully adopt specialized rules for
prosecutorial agencies that encourage independent peer or supervisory
participation in postconviction decisionmaking, particularly in cases in
which individual prosecutors face problems of role.
2. Providing outside input
Some postconviction justice decisions, when analyzed fairly, do
not fit the unique expertise of prosecutors. This Article has noted
instances in which particular issues are equitable in nature-for
example, whether a change in the law or a change in circumstances
justifies a modification of a previous conviction or sentence. It has
identified other instances in which prosecutors must decide whether
the culpable nature of the previous act of the prosecutor, the
prosecutor's office, or another law enforcement agent itself merits a
modification, even if the merits of the case do not.
The prosecutor's office inevitably must participate in resolving
these cases because they have the pertinent information and an
overview of what constitutes a significant change or true fault by law
enforcement personnel. Arguably, however, judicial and citizen input
are equally valuable in reaching an unbiased view of what society
would consider to be an equitable solution. The legislative or
administrative adoption of a mechanism for including external input
-a citizen or lawyer advisory board perhaps-would serve that
204
function.
3. Providing standards for particular substantive issues
At least two categories of postconviction justice issues call for
systematic resolution at a policy level, rather than resolution through
the exercise of individual prosecutorial discretion. Pertinent policies
203. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, ProfessionalDiscipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
1-10 (1991); Milton R. Wessell, InstitutionalResponsibility: Professionalismand Ethics, 60 NEB.
L. REV. 504, 511-13 (1981); Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining,supra note 4, at 1371-73; cf.
Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. Wilkins, A New Frameworkfor Law Firm Discipline, 16 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 335, 336 (2003) (arguing for a requirement of "structural supervision" within law
firms); Committee on Professional Responsibility, Discipline of Law Firms, 48 THE RECORD 628,
638 (1993) (proposing entity liability rule for New York).
204. The notion of external input is not far-fetched or unworkable. In the DNA context, at
least two prosecutors' offices already have instituted procedures through which defense counsel
and neutral evaluators participate in screening cases in which postconviction action may be
appropriate. See, e.g., Delcour, supra note 95, at 1 (discussing Oklahoma County's program);
Reza, supranote 93, at B-2 (discussing Orange County, California program).
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for such cases should be implemented by legislative decision or
internal administrative standards.
First, prosecutorial reactions to the availability of new
evidence-gathering technology that has the potential to correct
previous errors should be regularized. DNA evidence, for example, can
conclusively establish the reliability or unreliability of core evidence in
a range of rape, sexual assault, and other cases. The decision of
whether to reevaluate the previous evidence, allow defendants to
conduct DNA tests at their own expense, or treat the matter as closed
should not depend on the happenstance of whether an individual
prosecutor is openminded or resistant to a new result. On the other
hand, numerous legitimate factors are relevant to the decision,
including the likelihood of error, the burden any approach will impose
on state laboratories and evidence-gathering personnel, and equality
among defendants of different means. As already has occurred in some
jurisdictions, it makes sense for a uniform rule weighing these
20 5
considerations to be developed and subjected to public review.
Second, for both resource and fairness reasons, it seems
important for society to develop some notion of when prosecutors
should involve themselves in ancillary legal proceedings that bear on a
case in which the prosecutors' office has been involved. In part, this
should be a legislative decision. To the extent a legislature envisions a
statutory procedure as a direct supplement to prosecution (as in the
case of parole or civil commitment for sex offenders), it should either
assign to prosecutors the role of implementing the supplementary
procedure or identify the extent to which prosecutors (and information
in their possession) should be involved. In these situations, the
statutory procedures are designed to further essentially the same
state interests as criminal prosecution, so the legislature should weigh
the benefits of limiting prosecutorial involvement (e.g., to maintaining
prosecutorial independence and saving prosecutorial resources)
against the economies of scale.
Many ancillary proceedings, however, are not similarly
targeted. Damage lawsuits, custody decisions, and restraining orders,
for example, may benefit victims whom prosecutions also seek to
benefit, but in different respects. Information in the prosecutor's
possession and the light prosecutors can shed on the civil matter may
be essential to the success of the proceeding. However, the extent to
which prosecutors should identify with victims is debatable, for the
duty to serve justice sometimes requires prosecutors to emphasize the
rights of other constituents. Prosecutorial participation in civil
205. See supratext accompanying note 93.
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matters may be perceived by some observers as engaging in vindictive
behavior and implicates the use of societal resources in ostensibly
private matters.
Left to their own devices, prosecutors are likely to decide
whether to involve themselves in ancillary proceedings on the basis of
how sympathetic they feel to the particular person requesting
assistance and how much antipathy they feel towards the defendant.
Viewed objectively, however, the core of the issue should be how
society wants its prosecutorial resources to be spent. Because the
number and kinds of ancillary proceedings in which prosecutors might
become involved are limited, it is feasible for legislatures and
prosecutorial agencies to determine suitable prosecutorial conduct by
policy or rule.
C. PotentialInternal Changes by Prosecutors' Offices
If this Article suggests nothing else, it is clear that individual
prosecutors currently lack a basis on which to recognize and resolve
postconviction justice issues. Ethics rules can highlight some of these
issues and identify decisionmaking criteria. Legislative and
administrative policies can address and resolve other issues. Yet in
the end, many of the problem situations will remain fact-sensitive.
Experience and a "common law" of prosecutorial decisions will provide
the most useful guidance.
Under current decisionmaking regimes, however, neither
experience nor a common law are brought to bear on postconviction
justice issues, for decisions are left to individual, usually short-term,
prosecutors to reach on an ad hoc basis. Three possible remedies for
this shortcoming spring to mind.
First, prosecutors' offices should highlight postconviction
justice issues in their manuals and administrative guidelines. At a
minimum, internal guidelines can accomplish as much as new code
provisions in establishing principles governing the presumption of
guilt and the legitimacy of specific questionable criteria. They
probably can go further in at least selecting policies regarding the
office's attitudes towards particular categories of cases.
Second, a prosecutor's office might assign a single prosecutor,
or committee of prosecutors, to resolve or participate in deciding these
issues, in much the way some law firms now assign in-house ethics
specialists to review professional responsibility issues. 206 Participation
206. See generally Elizabeth Chambliss and David B. Wilkins, The Emerging Role of Ethics
Advisors, General Counsel, and Other Compliance Specialists in Large Law Firms, 44 ARIZ. L.
REV. 559, 559 (2002) (providing an empirical study evaluating the "[a]necdotal evidence.., that
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of specialists allows these decisionmakers to develop experience and
expertise, by virtue of seeing a range of postconviction justice cases.
They can, ever-increasingly, bring that experience and expertise to
bear in a systematic fashion.
Third, prosecutors' offices should develop an internal "common
law." They simply must require that cases involving postconviction
justice dilemmas be recorded by memorandum and maintained in a
centralized location. This kind of recorded history can provide what
currently is missing in the literature: cases and commentary
regarding the issues. Over time, shared wisdom will develop.
VI. CONCLUSION

This Article has not set forth a framework, or frameworks, for
resolving all the issues that fit within its purview. It has, however, set
the stage for deeper consideration of a problem that previously has
gone unnoticed. Part II's elaboration of the range of cases that
implicate prosecutors' postconviction duties alone is significant. It
should alert prosecutors to responsibilities that they often ignore. By
analyzing the core considerations that make the issues difficult, Part
IV should heighten prosecutors' sensitivity in resolving the issues. It
should also encourage commentators, legislators, ethics code drafters,
and other regulators to develop appropriate responses. Part V offers a
start in that direction.
At a minimum, this Article highlights the need for attention to
a serious void in the literature addressing postconviction prosecutorial
conduct. By calling upon prosecutors to serve "justice," the courts and
code drafters act as if that concept is one prosecutors can readily
understand and implement. The failure of the ethics codes and
standards even to note criteria relevant to postconviction issues
demonstrates the fallacy of that assumption. If well-meaning
prosecutors are to satisfy the obligations that society has placed upon
them-at their peril, one might add-far more guidance is required.
large law firms increasingly are turning to in-house ethics advisors, firm general counsel, and
other specialists to manage the firm's compliance with professional regulation").

